The Adam & Eve

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Genesis 3:6

 

 

Genesis 3:6 (Section 25): “And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of its fruit and ate; and she also gave some to her husband, and he ate.”

 

+       And (when) the woman saw that the tree was good for food,

+       and that it was a delight to the eyes,

+      and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise,1

+       she took of its fruit and ate;

+       and she also gave some to her husband2 (with her?3)

+       and he ate.

 

               The storyteller does not identify the tree which the woman sees as the tree of the knowledge of good and bad4

               It is not stated that the woman goes to the (unidentified) tree because of what the serpent has says5

               The time lag between the woman’s conversation with the serpent and the moment she sees the (unidentified) tree is not given6

               How the woman sees7 when her eyes are not yet open is not stated8

               How the woman sees ‘that the tree is good for food’, when she has not yet acquired the knowledge of good and bad, is a mystery9

               The storyteller states that the woman ‘sees that the tree was to be desired to make (one) wise’

               It is not stated how the woman is able to see that the tree can make (one) wise10

               It is not stated why to be wise is worthy of desire

               The storyteller does not explain what is meant by ‘wise’11

               It is not stated that to be wise is the same as having the knowledge of good and bad12

               The storyteller does not state that the woman sees that the tree will provide the knowledge of good and bad13

               It is not stated by the storyteller that the woman sees that by eating of the tree she will become ‘as the gods’ or ‘as God’, nor, indeed, as the Lord God14

               It is not stated by the storyteller or the woman that she wants become ‘as the gods’ or ‘as God’, nor, indeed, as the Lord God15

               It is not stated that the woman eats the fruit because of what the serpent says16

               Whether or not the serpent is present when the woman takes the fruit and eats it is not stated

               It is not stated that the Lord God is present as the woman eats of the tree17

               Whether or not the woman is tempted by her desire for wisdom is not stated18

               The woman does not state why she eats of the tree19

               The woman introduces the notion of desire20

               The Lord God does not condemn desire21

               It is clearly stated that ‘the woman sees the tree’. Therefore it could be concluded that she is alone22

               Whether or not the man is present as she takes and eats the fruit is not stated23

               It is not stated that the woman, having eaten of the tree, reacts with fear (or shame)24

               Having eaten of the tree, the woman does not die,25 i.e. in the day

               Having eaten of the (unidentified) tree, the woman does not state that she has become wise

               The storyteller does not state that the woman, having eating of the tree, has ‘seen’ (or acquired) the knowledge of good and bad26

               The time lag between the moment when the woman eats the fruit (and nothing happens) and the moment when she gives of the fruit to the man, now ‘with her’, and he eats thereof (and something happens to both), is not given27

               The storyteller does not state that the woman speaks to the man as she gives him the fruit to eat and he eats28

               It is not stated that the man recognises that the fruit which the woman gives him comes from the tree ‘that is to be desired to make one wise’, nor, indeed, that it is the fruit of the tree of which the Lord God has commanded him not to eat on pain of ‘death in the day’29

               It is not stated that the woman encourages the man to eat the fruit, or that she dares or challenges him; nor is it stated that she temps or seduces him to eat. She simply gives him the fruit, i.e. when he is with her, apparently in silence, and he eats30

               Whether or not picking fruit is the woman’s task, i.e. as help-as-counterpart, is not stated31

               The fruit is not named

               The woman does not state her reason for giving some of the fruit to the man to eat32

               It is not stated that the man sees that the fruit ‘is to be desired to make one wise’33

               It is not stated that the man desires, hence is ‘tempted’ by the fruit34 given to him by the woman35

               The man does not state that he desires to be wise

               It is not stated that the man desires to be ‘as the gods’ or ‘as God’, nor, indeed, as the Lord God36

               It is not stated that the man desires the woman37

               The reason why the man eats the fruit which the woman gives him (in silence) is not stated38

               It is not stated how subtle the man and the woman are,39 or if the woman, having eaten of the tree, is (now) more subtle (i.e. wiser) than the man40

               The storyteller does not state that the man and the woman eat the fruit of the forbidden tree to intentionally break the Lord God’s command to the man41

               … and so on and on42

÷

 

Footnotes Section 25

 

25.1 … The term ‘wise’ is translated from the Hebrew term sakal (Strong 07919) meaning: to be (causatively, make or act) circumspect and hence, intelligent; consider, expert, instruct, prosper, (deal) prudent(-ly), (give) skill(-ful), have good success, teach, (have, make to) understand(-ing), wisdom, (be, behave self, consider, make) wise(- ly), guide wittingly. Take your pick1,2

25.1.1 … This crucial verse fragment, “and that the tree was to be desired to make (one) wise”, is missing from both the Septuagint and the Vulgate. The Hebrews who translate this verse fragment alter it to read, “and beautiful to contemplate.” The deliberate Septuagint error is translated in the Vulgate as “and delightful to behold.” This is a very serious corruption of the original story. Why the Septuagint translators choose to introduce this deception is not known.1

25.1.1.1 … Since it appears that Paul reads the Septuagint rather than the original Hebrew text, he would not have known that desire is included in the story and, more importantly, that desire is not condemned by Yahweh God. Whether or not this error is part of the original Septuagint (it is included in the Aramaic Targums of Jonathan1 and Onqelos) or is inserted later into Christian translations into Greek of the original Hebrew text, hence into pseudo Septuagints, is not known2

25.1.1.1.1 … The Targum of Jonathan reads, “And the woman saw Sammael the angel of death and she was afraid. She knew that the tree was good to eat, and that it was a cure for the light of her eyes, and that the tree was desirable as a source of wisdom.” It is interesting to not that the tree which the woman sees is qualified as (hence called) ‘a source of wisdom’ rather than a source of the knowledge of good and bad

25.1.1.1.2 … Research has shown that eventually three (possibly five) versions of the Septuagint are produced, i.e. two before Christianity emerged and three thereafter. That several versions of the Septuagint were in circulation is shown by the fact that the verse fragment, “, … yet your desire was (or is) for your husband” is quoted by Philo of Alexandria (hence is a quotation from his pre-Christian era Septuagint version), but is missing from the Septuagint version translated by Brenton (in 1851 A.D.)1 and from Jerome’s Vulgate2

25.1.1.1.2.1 … Why a Christian translator would have removed references to desire, both as covetousness (Hebrew: chamad, meaning: to desire, covet, take pleasure in, take delight in (Strong 02530)) and as desire, presumably of the flesh (Hebrew: (Hebrew: teshuwqah: meaning: (desire), longing, craving (Strong 08669)), from the story is obvious.1 The fact that the Lord God apparently ‘makes’ the woman with the capacity for desire (as covetousness, for instance of wisdom) and then sentences the woman to have desire (presumably physical longing), albeit for her husband, scuppers Paul’s blanket (hence universal and absolute) but prohibition of (unspecified) covetousness, i.e. as desire (Hebrew: chamad), and of desire of the flesh (Hebrew, teshuwqah) put forward (i.e. Rom 7:7) via his deliberate misquotation of the 10th Commandment, namely, “ Thou shalt not covet!”

25.1.1.1.2.1.1 … Both references to desire (German: Begehren) are still missing from Luther’s Bible translation of 1534, though he does offered a garbled version of this verse, namely, “/das ein lustiger bawm were/weil er klug mechte/…”, and which translates as, “… that it was a merry, gay or happy (possibly delightful) tree, because it made clever (or wise)” Consequently both Luther’s and Paul’s interpretations of desire, and of its divinely installed and/or superimposed function and purpose, are seriously compromised

25.1.1.1.2.2 … Augustine’s Pentateuch source is unknown. He does not appear to use the Septuagint or Vulgate versions of this story since he quotes (indeed misquotes, i.e. in his book, Against the Manichees), “And the woman saw,” it says, “that the tree was good for food and that it was good for the eyes for seeing and knowing”.” Whether or not Augustine mistranslates the verse fragment deliberately in order to remove the word ‘desire’ (Hebrew: chamad, meaning: to desire, covet, take pleasure in, take delight in) is not known. Later on, he again succeeds in eliminating the word ‘desire’ (Hebrew: teshuwqah, meaning: longing or craving) from the story when he deliberately mistranslates, “Scripture adds after the birth, “You will turn to (rather than desire, my insertion) your man, and he will rule over you.” Do not many or almost all women give birth while their husbands are absent and, after birth, turn to them?” By twice removing the word desire, Augustine can sustain his invective against the (sensual) pleasures (hence sins) of the flesh. This is serious deception

25.1.2 … The introduction into the narrative by the storyteller of the highly ambiguous term ‘wise’ is strange indeed. Had the storyteller said, “… and that the tree was to be desired to make one know good and bad”, then the subsequent events and the final moral of the story would have been clear-cut and compelling. As it is told by the storyteller, this verse in no way indicates with absolute certainty that the tree which the woman sees, and from which she eats, and whose fruit she gives to the man to eat, is in fact the tree of the knowledge of good and bad. It could just as well have been the tree of life,1 or, indeed a different tree altogether. It appears that the verse fragment, “… and that the tree was to be desired to make (one) wise”, is inserted later to add irrelevant and uncertain content1 to the story to complicate it further by merely appearing to spin it towards the ‘crime and punishment’ super-plot

25.1.2.1 … There is a serious difficulty here. Augustine writes, “So that the tree of life would seem to have been in the terrestrial Paradise what the wisdom of God is in the spiritual, of which it is written, “She is a tree of life to them that lay hold upon her”.” Later on, Gregory of Nyssa writes in the same vein, “ … and Solomon, when he names Wisdom herself (which is the Lord) ‘a tree of life’.” If wisdom is associated with the tree of life, then it is at least possible that the woman sees the tree of life and the picks its fruit. After all, the storyteller does not state that she picks the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and bad. Why he does not do so is quite a mystery, unless the whole story is far more complex than even Christian interpreters suggest1

25.1.2.1.1 … It is quite possible (and I’m speculating here!) that the final version of the story was arrived at in three stages (and several minor, politically motivated redactions). It all started with a simple passage narrative. However, it was later deemed necessary to explain how the passage (i.e. from infancy to puberty (i.e. from nakedness to being clothed) came to happen. However, it was also deemed necessary to fudge the actual driver of change, thereby leaving several options for change open. Later on, it was decided that what was needed was a ‘crime and punishment’ story that purported to explain the origin of sin (and of evil), and that blame had to be shifted away from the contemporary laity to a ‘fall guy’ (i.e. scapegoat’. That’s when the cursing and the ‘driving out’ (i.e. suggesting a violent expulsion after the man had already been sent forth) fragments were added to the (merely apparent) sentences

25.1.2.2 … Mathematicians would consider the addition of uncertain (or indefinite) content as the addition of an infinity, and which makes resolution of the problem impossible (i.e. unending). In short, the addition of not just this uncertain statement to the story (plus several more uncertain statements included in this verse) serves to make the story (indeed myth) more uncertain, thereby deepening the trance (or enchantment, i.e. the ‘down time’) of the listener or reader. There is quite exquisite meaning (i.e. purpose, and which intents to freeze (i.e. to mental (and physical) catalepsy) the listener or reader to enable installation of programming, hence manipulation) to this madness

25.2 … In the original Hebrew the fragment reads: “…; she also gave some to her1 husband2 with her.”

25.2.1 … The use of the possessive pronoun ‘her’ is strange indeed. After all, only one man has been formed and possession cannot yet have been an issue. The sudden appearance of the possessive pronoun suggest strongly that this verse fragment (indeed the whole verse) is a later insertion

25.2.2 … In the original text, the Hebrew term ish, meaning man, is used. Why the term ish is here translated as ‘husband’ rather than as man is not known

25.3 … The literal translation goes, “… and she gave some to her husband with her”.1 Whether or not the man is with her when she first goes to the tree and takes of its fruit and eats it is uncertain.2 However, the fact the storyteller states, “… and (when) the woman saw that the tree, etc, …”, rather than “… and (when) they saw that the tree, etc, …”, suggests that the man is not present

25.3.3.1 … Had this verse fragment been presented as a separate verse, as, indeed, many other whole verses (i.e. complete memes or contexts) were split up in order to break up the context, thereby changing its meaning, then the meaning of this verse fragment might have been more clearly established

25.3.3.2 … The time lag between the moment when the woman eats the fruit and (later on, or elsewhere, and when he is described as being ‘with her’) gives some to ‘her husband’ and he eats it is not given. In short, it is not stated that the woman goes to the tree with the man. Nor is it stated that she gives the man the fruit to eat immediately after she has done so, and beneath or near the tree. It is not stated precisely when (or where) she gives the man the fruit. This is crucial circumstantial evidence. After all, the man, when interrogated, does not confirm that he knew precisely which fruit he was given to eat

25.4 … This is a quite extraordinary and crucial omission. The fact that the storyteller does not state that she goes to ‘the midst of the garden’ (and where she claims, wrongly, that the forbidden tree is grown), and the fact that the tree which the woman sees is not identified as the tree of the knowledge of good and bad1 either by the storyteller or her,2 opens up a can or worms. Whether both omissions are intentional or the result of sloppy editing or forgery cannot now be determined

25.4.1 … It is not absolutely certain that the woman goes to the tree of the knowledge of good and bad, sees it and eats of it. After all, in her conversation with the serpent the woman refers to the tree in the midst of the garden, and which is the tree of life. Neither the storyteller nor the Lord God provides a description either of the tree of life or of the tree of the knowledge of good and bad, or of their fruit. Whether or not she picks and eats the fruit of the tree forbidden to the man (but not to her…. recall that the storyteller does not state that the Lord God commands her not to eat of the tree) is not certain. It is generally assumed that she picks the fruit of the tree forbidden to the man and gives some of it to him to eat. However, that assumption can neither be verified nor falsified,1,2 therefore used as direct (i.e. hard) evidence

25.4.1.1 … There is huge uncertainty here since, having eaten of the tree, the pair merely ‘know that they are naked.’ The storyteller does not state that the pair acquire the knowledge of good and bad but merely the knowledge of nakedness. Later on, i.e. during interrogation, neither the man nor the woman claims (or confess) to having acquired the knowledge of good and bad. The man admits to the knowledge of nakedness. Whether or not the knowledge of nakedness is the same as the knowledge of good, or bad, or of both or neither, is not stated. The storyteller does not state that having eaten they become ‘wise.’ Nor does he state that they are ashamed after they have eaten of the tree

25.4.1.2 … If the Lord God’s part statement (in verse 11) is accepted as authentic, and true, namely, “but of the tree of the knowledge of good and bad you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die”, then the fact that the man does not die not only ‘proves’ that the fruit which he ate did not come from the forbidden tree but that the woman actually picked the fruit of the tree of life growing in the midst of the garden

25.4.2 … The woman identifies the tree as, “… good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, …’, whereby she does not explain what she means by ‘wise’.1 Whether this is an exact description of the tree of the knowledge of good and bad is anybody’s guess

25.4.2.1 … This opens up another can of worms (or casket of diamonds). Does ‘wise’ mean the same for both the help-as-counterpart and her counterpart, the adam? If it is assumed, and this is speculation, that the adam becomes ‘wise’ by eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and bad, then it is highly likely that his help-as-counterpart, and who is, being a women, fundamentally different from him, rather than merely an opposite, i.e. a differential of identical capacity, might seek the ‘wisdom’ which the tree of life (read: initiation into her reproductive function) would offer, the more so the ancient Hebrews understood knowledge (and, presumably, the wisdom that results from relativized knowledge) to be primary experience. What interest, indeed, would the counterpart have in the adam’s wisdom (read: experience), and vice versa1

25.4.2.1.1 … Centuries later, Christian priests will not just devalue, but debase, even demonize women’s wisdom, simply because they don’t understand (or want to understand) it because it is so unlike and contrary to their own (hence operating as genuine counterpart, just as the Lord God had made it)

25.5 … The storyteller does not state that the woman is beguiled, tricked, hypnotised1 or tempted2 by what the serpent says and that that is the reason why she goes to and picks and eats of the (unspecified) tree

25.5.1 … The woman later claims, possibly in her defence, possibly as a statement of fact or of her belief), that she was ‘beguiled’ (Hebrew: nasha) by the serpent i.e. by what the serpent says. Strong (05377) interprets nasha to mean: to lead astray, i.e. (mentally) to delude, or (morally) to seduce: beguile, deceive, X greatly, X utterly). However, Young interprets, hence translates the effect which the serpent’s words have on her as, “The serpent hath caused me to forget”, and which suggests if not hypnotism then at least as mental misdirection (such as practiced with consummate skill by Paul, Augustine and Luther1 and, indeed the original teller of this story). That the woman could be beguiled by the truth, for it turns out that the serpent speaks the truth (almost), that it so say, what ‘the gods know’, is a bit of a mystery

25.5.1.1 … Luther, or the editor of the 2nd edition of his Bible translation of 1545, demonstrates his proclivity for unconscionable mental misdirection by introducing false, i.e. wholly misleading chapter headings (e.g. ‘the fall into sin’, though neither ‘fall’ nor ‘sin’ are mentioned in the story) into his German translation (now, because corrupted, a version) of the story of Adam and Eve. The purpose of these bogus chapter headings is obvious. They serve to create skewed (to his view) tunnel vision. The fact that Luther adds ‘letters’, indeed false ones, to the Bible indicates a sheer unbelievable disrespect for this (allegedly) ‘holy’ book

25.5.2 … If a temptation (read: a ‘proving’) situation is set up, then it is done by the Lord God when he first forms all the tree ‘good for food and pleasant to the sight’, then commands him to eat of all of them, then forbids the man not to eat from one of them.1 The Lord God does not forbid the woman to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and bad. The storyteller states that the woman is ‘drawn’ (i.e. tempted, in the modern sense of the word) to eat of ‘the tree in the midst of the garden’ because by her desire (or covetousness) to be wise (rather than acquire the knowledge of good and bad). It is not stated that she feels tempted (i.e. to ‘prove’ herself) to become ‘as God’, or ‘as the gods’ or even as the Lord God. It is not stated that she seeks (i.e. intends, or is tempted) to break the Lord God’s command in order to demonstrate her independence, i.e. her freedom of will, and, indeed, her pride2

25.5.2.1 … Recall Philo’s difficulty when he tries to interpret this verse (actually verses 10 & 11). He writes, ““But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil ye (sic!) shall not eat.” Therefore this tree is not in the Paradise. For God encourages them (sic!) to eat of every tree that is in the Paradise. But when he forbids them to eat of this tree, it is plain that it is not in the Paradise; and this is in accordance with natural philosophy.” There is in fact no direct evidence that the tree of the knowledge of good and bad is grown in the garden. That the tree of life is grown in the garden is specifically stated in verse 3, and suggested in verses 42 and 43

25.5.2.2 … Augustine speculates as to why the forbidden fruit is eaten, albeit in relation to the man: “but if he offended the Lord his God by a proud and disobedient use of his free will, he should become subject to death, and live as the beasts do, the slave of appetite, and doomed to eternal punishment after death.” That is not in the story

25.6 … Later interpreters of the story suggest that the woman goes immediately to the midst of (but possibly into) the garden to eat of the tree that grown in its midst, and which they assume is the forbidden tree, though the storyteller does not identify it as such. Whether or not the woman goes to the tree, and which is clearly described by the woman, but not as the tree of the knowledge of good and bad) immediately, an hour, a day or a month later, or when she happens to come across it (possibly because it grows amidst the tress rather than in their midst), is not known with certainty. However, knowing the time lag (and, indeed, the change of location from the place where the conversation between the serpent and the woman took place) would provide circumstantial evidence (albeit weak) as to how effective the serpent’s alleged beguiling was

25.7 … The storyteller does not explain how the woman ‘sees’ that ‘the tree is good for food’.1 The English word see is the translation of the Hebrew word ra'ah, meaning; to see, literally or figuratively (in numerous applications, direct and implied, transitive, intransitive and causative); advise self, appear, approve, behold, X certainly, consider, discern, (make to) enjoy, have experience, gaze, take heed, lo , look and so on. After all, it is assumed (but not proven) that she has not eaten of the forbidden tree, and which would have allowed her to distinguish, in fact ‘know’ (the abstract, and indeed, relative concepts of) good and bad

25.7.1 … Recall that in verse 3 “… the Lord God made to grow every three that is pleasant to the sight and good for food, …”, then proceeds to command the man to eat of all of the trees in the garden, but not of the tree of the knowledge of good and bad (and which may or may not be growing in the garden). Verse 3 does not suggest that the man needs to ‘see’ that the trees are ‘good for food’, hence does not need to be able to distinguish between (i.e. have the knowledge of) good and bad. This is crucial.

25.8 … When the storyteller states, “… and when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, ..”, it is not made clear by him to which set of ‘eyes’ the woman uses. In all, the woman uses three sets of eyes, namely the set that allows her to negotiate her way around the garden, the set that allows her to (physically) see the various (abstract) qualities of the (unspecified, i.e. (hence) unnamed) tree1 and the set of eyes that ‘open’2 after she eats of the fruit and ‘knows’ that she is naked

25.8.1 … The fact that the woman is able to ‘see’ (hence understand via conscious, physical discrimination) the abstract qualities of the (otherwise unspecified) tree indicates that the first question which the Lord God puts to the man (in verse 30) namely, “Who told you that you were naked?” is extremely meaningful. If the initial fragment of this verse is linked to the Lord God’s first (therefore quite possibly the more important) question to the man, then it does appear that the knowledge of good and bad, insofar as it is the acquire (or activated) capacity to distinguish relativities, can be acquired by word of mouth (i.e. for instance via a conversation with a serpent). That might suggest that the conversation with the serpent has activated her capacity to distinguish (i.e. ‘see’) particular relativities (to wit, good and bad)

25.8.2 … Whether or not ‘opening of the eyes’, and which results in knowing (Hebrew: yada, meaning, to know1) is equivalent to awakening or emerging of a consciousness that distinguishes (abstract) relatives is not stated

25.8.2.1 … The precise meaning of the Hebrew term, yada (Strong 3045) is uncertain. Its semantic elasticity is extraordinary. Yada is translated to mean, to know (properly, to ascertain by seeing); used in a great variety of senses, figuratively, literally, euphemistically and inferentially (including observation, care, recognition; and causatively, instruction, designation, punishment, etc.) (as follow): acknowledge, acquaintance(-ted with), advise, answer, appoint, assuredly, be aware, (un-)awares, can(-not), certainly, comprehend, consider, X could they, cunning, declare, be diligent, (can, cause to) discern, discover, endued with, familiar friend, famous, feel, can have, be (ig-)norant, instruct, kinsfolk, kinsman, (cause to let, make) know, (come to give, have, take) knowledge, have (knowledge), (be, make, make to be, make self) known, + be learned, + lie by man, mark, perceive, privy to, X prognosticator, regard, have respect, skilful, shew, can (man of) skill, be sure, of a surety, teach, (can) tell, understand, have (understanding), X will be, wist, wit, wot. Moreover, since yada is also used in verse 44 to describe the means whereby the adam ‘knew’ his ‘wife’, thereby getting her pregnant, yada can also mean, copulate, have sexual intercourse and so on. Take your pick!

25.9 …That the woman actually ‘sees’ that ‘the tree is good for food’, hence has the capacity to physically discriminate between good and bad, suggests that she has either eaten of the tree of the knowledge of good and bad, probably outside the garden, and where she appears to have encountered the serpent (that is to say, if the ‘living of the field’ are excluded from the garden, therefore requiring the man to guard it) (my opinion), or she has been stimulated by the serpent to discriminate, that later existing outside the garden where not all trees and plants, and, indeed, other living of the field’ are ‘good for food’,1 thereby activating her capacity to make distinctions (specifically between good and bad). There is serious uncertainty here

25.9.1 … There may be (albeit weak) circumstantial evidence here that the tree of the knowledge of good and bad is grown outside the garden and, moreover, not prohibited to the ‘living of the field.’ After all, the ‘living of the field’ would have needed to be able to distinguish good from bad in order to survive. Ensconced in the garden, the man would not have needed the knowledge of good and bad. The storyteller does not state that the woman is ‘put’ (and possibly kept) in the garden

25.10 … There is a massive problem, indeed contradiction here. How the woman can physically see, rather than mentally know (i.e. as she will later know that she is naked), that to be wise, of which she has no knowledge (or experience), is desirable,1 is a mystery. After all, the serpent did not initiate her to wisdom but merely told her what ‘the gods know’

25.10.1 … The Lord God does not describe either one of the two special trees as ‘to be desired to make one wise’. If it is inferred from the scant detail related by the storyteller, namely that life in and around the garden is pretty basic (i.e. naïve, to wit, ‘naked’), then the sudden desire ‘to be wise’,1 and which is a very sophisticated desire, specifically if up till then desire for fruit that is ‘a delight to the eyes’ is all that the woman desired (it is not stated that she desires the adam),2 simply does not fit into the narrative

25.10.1.1 … There appears to be no link between the conversation between the serpent and the woman, and which appears to refer to the tree of the knowledge of good and bad and of its affect, and the woman’s desire to be wise. Hence it might be inferred that this verse fragment is a later text corruption inserted for not unknown (or denied) reason1

25.10.1.1.1 … As late as 650 A.D., Maximos (i.e. the Confessor) writes, no doubt taking his cue from Augustine and the Hebrew prophets, “The tree of life, when understood as symbolizing wisdom,1 likewise differs greatly from the tree of the knowledge of good and bad, in that the latter neither symbolizes wisdom nor is said to do so.” Elsewhere he gives a fine example of excellent religious cult logic when he writes, “ Undoubtedly, the tree of life is productive of life; the tree that is not called the tree of life, and so is not productive of life, is obviously productive of death. For only death is the opposite of life.” Maximos quite obviously did not read the story. Death happens not because the tree of the knowledge of good and bad is eaten but because the adam is prevented from outing of it

25.10.1.1.1.1 … Since ancient times, wisdom has been deemed to be one of the qualities of the tree of life. Whether this understanding is derived from this verse fragment or comes from a non-biblical source is not known to me. However, since wisdom is associated with (or symbolized by, according to Maximos), the tree of life, then it appears that the woman sees, and eats from, the tree of life and not from the tree of the knowledge of good and bad

25.10.1.2 … The storyteller does not state anywhere in his story that the man or the woman express desire to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and bad. At no time does the man express a desire to be wise. It is not stated in the story that the man ever sees either the tree of life or the tree of the knowledge of good and bad. Furthermore, it is not stated by the storyteller that the man ever eats of either the tree of life or of the tree of the knowledge of good and bad. That the man has eaten of the latter tree is a claim made later by the Lord God, a claim derived from very weak circumstantial evidence and not validated by the man. The man merely states that he ate the fruit which the woman gave him. He does not confirm that he knew which fruit that was

25.11 … Whether or not ‘to be wise’ means the same to the woman as it does to the man and/or to the Lord God is not stated1

25.11.1 … Whether the wisdom that appeals to the woman is the wisdom (or experience) of life, i.e. as reproduction, and which, perhaps, the fruit of the tree of life provides, or it is the wisdom which the tree of the knowledge of good and bad provides, and which, possibly, would have appealed to the man (though he does not desire it), is not stated1

25.11.1.1 … After all, the woman is ‘made’ as help-as-counterpart, hence is provided with functions and characteristics (fundamentally) different from the man. In other words, it (i.e. the counterpart, later described as ‘she’) is not made as another man (and who would act as a counterpart because opposite but not different), hence cannot be expected to respond as a man. This is crucial circumstantial evidence

25.12 … Whether or not the term sakal (i.e. translated as wisdom or prudence) means the same to the ancient Hebrews as the term ‘wise’ means to Paul, Augustine and Luther is not known

25.13 … This is quite extraordinary. The fact that the storyteller (or a later redactor) has the woman describe what she sees (rather than knows), namely that the tree “was to be desired to make one wise” rather than that it ‘was to be desired to give one the knowledge of good and bad’, and which would have closed out the story, introduces terminal uncertainty (i.e. an endless (i.e. infinitely) open question) into this didactic parable (i.e. fairy tale)

25.14 … This is crucial omission. It is not stated that the woman (physically) ‘sees (rather than knows) that the tree is to be desired in order to become as the gods’ (or even as the Lord God). It is not stated, indeed not even suggested, that eating of this tree will result in becoming ‘as the gods’

25.15 … This is another crucial omission. The early Church Fathers, taking their lead from Paul, who appears to have taken his’ from very late Hebrew interpretation of this story, assume that the woman eats of the (unidentified) tree because she wants to ‘be as God’, meaning that she wants to be as Yahweh God, and that pride drives her desire. Neither the storyteller nor the woman confirms that assumption. The woman gives her reasons for eating of the (unidentified, but for her description) tree. Providing reasons for eating of the tree, i.e. other than those which the woman provides, is speculation

25.16 … The storyteller or a later redactor would not have had a problem inserting a verse fragment that creates a direct link between what the serpent says and what the woman does; in short, a statement that makes absolutely clear (i.e. certain) that the woman’s act of eating from the (unidentified) tree results directly from what the serpent says. However, no such link is made in the story

25.17 … The Lord God later asserts, i.e. in verse 36, that “Because you have listened to the voice of your1 wife…”. It is not stated how the Lord God arrives at His knowledge since He appears not to have been present when the woman picks the fruit and eats it, and when He might have intervened to stop her later on. Nor is it stated that the Lord God is present when the woman gives some of the fruit to the man (now with her) to eat, and when He might have stopped the man from committing suicide2

25.17.1 … Note the introduction of the possessive pronoun ‘your’. Since the man and his counterpart are alone, the notion of possession (and therefore the use of the possessive pronoun) would have been absurd. This suggests that this verse fragment is later insertion

25.17.2 … Why the woman, and, indeed, the Lord God (and of whom it is asserted that he ‘foresees’ all, and which is obviously wrong) should have put the man’s life at risk is not known. It is not known why the woman believes, or chooses to believe, that what the serpent tells her about what the gods know is true

25.18 … That the woman eats of the tree because of her desire to be wise is strongly suggested because of how she regards the tree. That she eats of the tree to deliberately break the Lord God’s command is an unverifiable assumption.1 To what extent her capacity for desire is active, i.e. before the Lord God sentences her to desire, albeit for her ‘husband’, is not known. Whether or not she desires the adam before the Lord God passes His sentence on her is not stated in the story

25.18.1 … That the woman eats of the tree because of what the serpent said is unverifiable. That the woman eats of the tree to deliberately break the Lord God’s command to the man is not stated in the story, therefore is an unverifiable assumption. That the woman eats of the tree in order to become ‘as the gods’ or even as the Lord God is also an unverifiable assumption. During interrogation, the woman does not admit (i.e. confess) to desiring either to break the Lord God’s command or to be ‘as the gods’ or as the Lord God

25.19 … This is crucial. Since the woman does not give her true reason (or reasons) for eating from the tree, save that she claims that the serpent beguiled her (whatever that means), all reasons invented later by religious fiction writers are unverifiable assumptions. Assumptions are not facts, that is to say, they are not hard, i.e. ‘safe and sound’ evidence. That religious fiction, i.e. Rel-fi writers, such as Paul, Augustine and Luther, and who function as ‘expert witnesses,’ or so both Protestant and Catholic Communions claim, pass off their assumptions as facts is serious cheating, indeed perjury. Those who use the unfounded assumptions of these three seriously misguided religious fiction writers as premises to support their ‘presumption of guilt’ view, later established as absolutely true via Augustine’s unproven Original Sin theory, indulge in pernicious deception

25.20 … It is not known how the woman discovers or develops (or merely activates) desire. That she would have had desire for food, that is to say, to eat of the trees that are grown ‘pleasant to the sight’, is obvious. It is not stated that she has desire for the man, at least not until the Lord God sentences her to desire for her ‘husband’. However, the ‘desire to be wise’ is an extremely sophisticated desire and which takes considerable time to develop. The inclusion of this desire in this verse suggests a later insertion, the more so this desire does not refer to the tree of the knowledge of good and bad. It is not stated that the man has developed the desire for wisdom. Nor is it stated (indeed, anywhere in the story) that he has desire for the tree of the knowledge of good and bad

25.21 … Later on (in verse 35), the Lord God actually sentences (or appears to sentence) the woman to have desire (Hebrew: teshuwqah: meaning: (desire), longing, or craving, rather than chamad, meaning: to desire, covet, take pleasure in, take delight in), albeit for her ‘husband’. Whether or not that means that she will no longer have desire for wisdom, whatever wisdom means to her, is not stated. The Lord God does not state that desire, in this case (Hebrew: teshuwqah), presumably, ‘of the flesh’, is sinful, wicked or evil and so on. It is not stated that the woman’s desire to be wise (rather than have the knowledge of good and bad) is sinful, wicked, evil and so on. In short, not only is desire (specifically of the senses and of wisdom) not proscribed (i.e. forbidden) by the Lord God, desire (i.e. of the senses) is actually imposed by Him (at least for the woman). Later on, when the Lord God sees the need to issue Commandments, He proscribes desire (Hebrew: chamad) for the neighbours’ property. He does not proscribe (physical) desire (i.e. longing or craving). Paul’s blanket proscription of desire (to wit, “Thou shalt not covet”), and which he misquotes from the 10th commandment, is a lie. The Early Church fathers, in particular the Desert Fathers, claim, that desires is the root of sin, and forbid it absolutely. By so doing they drive the laity to repress the natural urge to desire and express that desire freely. Such repression has disastrous consequences for the laity, but wonderful consequences for the Church

25.22 … If the woman does arrive at the (unidentified) tree alone, then the man could not have stopped here picking the fruit, if indeed the tree is the one forbidden to him, and which is not certain. Moreover, since the tree is not identified, save by the woman’s personal descriptions, and since it is not stated that the man had ever seen that particular tree, then the man would not have recognised the fruit which she gives him to eat when he is with her. There is a some difficulty here

25.23 … It seems that the man is not present when the woman picks and eats the fruit since, had he been there, and since he had he not been beguiled or tempted - and which does not seem to have been the case -, he could have prevented the woman from picking and eating the fruit1,2 

25.23.1 … Since it is not stated that the man was beguiled (either by the serpent or the woman), he would have, because of the death threat, stopped the woman from picking the fruit of the tree and eating it

25.23.2 … Young’s less than literal translation states: “and giveth the fruit to her husband with her and he eats.” That seems to suggest that he is not with her as she picks the fruit and eats it. It is quite possible that the woman gives the man the fruit later, or elsewhere, when they meet up for tiffin

25.24 … The woman does not express any emotion (save the desire for wisdom). She does not express love, hate, happiness, unhappiness, fear, guilt, anger, shame, contrition and so. The story is silent on the woman’s of emotion, both before and after eating of the tree. Having discovered his nakedness, the man, but apparently not the woman, expresses fear (but not shame)

25.25 … Neither the Lord God nor the storyteller comment the fact that the woman does not die ‘in the day’ she eats of the (unidentified) tree

25.26 … It is not stated by the storyteller that the woman, having eaten of the tree, acquires either wisdom or the knowledge of good and bad. Nor does he state that the woman has committed a transgression, nor, indeed, that she has offended the Lord God in any way

25.27 … Whether or not the woman gives the man the fruit to eat immediately, or a few minutes, hours or days later, and at a different location, is not known

25.28 … It is not stated that the woman tells the man about her conversation with the serpent. It is not stated that she tells him she has eaten of the unidentified tree.1 Nor is it stated that, having told the man that she had eaten of the tree, she discloses to him her reason for eating of the unidentified tree, and which may or may not have been the tree forbidden to him. It is not stated by the storyteller that she informs the man that she is offering him the fruit of the tree of which she has eaten, and which could possibly be the one from which he is forbidden to eat. Nor is it stated that she urges the man to eat the fruit2

25.28.1 … The story does no record a single conversation between the man and the woman.1 She speaks only to the serpent and to the Lord God. Whether or not she communicates with the man at all, and how, is not known. She gives him the fruit without as much as a word. The storyteller does not indicate either that the woman attempts to trick the man or that the man feels that he is being tricked

25.28.1.1 …  The human relationship between the woman and the man is not described.1 Her function as help-as-counterpart is not described. It is not stated if her help-as-counterpart function (her function as a woman (i.e. female) appears not to have been activated as this point in the story) consists only in picking fruit for ‘her husband’ to eat, or if other functions are required of her, save helping him avoid loneliness if, indeed, he experiences loneliness, and which is not stated

25.28.1.1.1 … The story is silent on the very personal relationship between the man and the woman.1 It is silent on intimacy, if any, between the ‘husband’ and his ‘wife’. The story is silent on love, friendship, companionship, mutual respect, quality time activity and so on. The story is absolutely silent on a sexual or pre-sexual relationship between the ‘husband’ and his ‘wife’. The only time the man responds to the woman, apart from taking the fruit which she gives him, is when he renames her ‘Life’, though precisely why he decides to call her by that name is not known

25.28.1.1.1.1 … The story is also silent on the personal relationship between the woman and the Lord God and, moreover, between the man and the Lord God.1 It is stated that the Lord God forms the adam to ‘serve the ground’. He demands nothing of the man save that he refrain from eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and bad, because by eating of it ‘dying he will die in the day’. He clones the woman as help-as-counter part for the man, thereby specifying their relationship (i.e. in the most vague manner possible). Whether or not the Lord God makes any personal relationship demands on the woman is not stated in the story

25.28.1.1.1.1.1 … The Lord God neither states that he wants a personal relationship with the man, nor is a personal relationship (human or god-like) described. The man does not express the desire for a personal relationship with the Lord God. Later claims suggesting loss of relationship (for instance, by Benny 16), specifically the loss of sanctifying grace as most significant part of that relationship (grace, according to Augustine, being the all important part of their relationship), are fabrication. No one knows what the Lord God thinks or feels about the man, apart from worrying about the man’s loneliness (and which he resolves by making a help-as-counterpart for him) and his survival prospects (and which he tries to resolve by making a set of clothes for him). All that is known about their relationship is that the man is formed to ‘serve the ground’ and that the Lord God lays one charge (or health warning) upon the man

 25.28.2 … Later on, in verse 36, the Lord God states: “Because you have listened to (i.e. hearkened to, meaning obeyed) the voice of your wife …”. The storyteller does not state that the woman speaks to the man as she hands him the fruit to eat. When questioned by the Lord God, the man does not confirm (in verse 31) that the woman spoke to him as she gave him the fruit to eat, or that she urged him to eat the fruit. Only if the Lord God was present when the woman gave the man the fruit to eat could the Lord God have known if the woman spoke to the man and he listened (Hebrew: shama, meaning also to obey, see 36.1). But it is not stated that the Lord God is present when the man takers the fruit and eats it,1 for whatever reason. Hence the Lord God either makes an erroneous assumption, or He is relying on false hearsay. Why the storyteller produces conflicting statements is not known, unless the verse fragment, “Because you have listened to (i.e. obeyed) the voice of your wife (actually woman) …” is a later insertion intended to suggest either temptation by the woman or obedience to the woman rather than to the Lord God, or, indeed, deliberate intention on the part of the man to break the Lord God’s command (and which is not even suggested by the storyteller). Obviously, the Lord God’s uncertain assertion quoted above serves to increase the ambiguity of the story (or oracle)

25.28.2.1 … The fact that the Lord God asks the man two leading questions, i.e. in verse 30, namely, “Who told you that you were naked?” and, “Have you eaten of the tree of which I commanded you not to eat?”, indicates that the Lord God is ignorant of the going’s on between the woman and the man. The Lord God’s questions (more precisely stated, His mode of questioning that is intended elicit the facts, i.e. the truth) appear initially to be not only severely inept but also unfair. A fair (i.e. because not ‘leading’) question would have been, “What happened?”,1 and which would have given the man the opportunity to explain his understanding of the events and, perhaps, to try to defend his actions, if, indeed, he thinks it necessary to defend his actions. See the footnotes to sentences 30 and 31

25.28.2.1.1 … The man actually responds to this (unspoken) question, rather than to the Lord God’s leading questions, by stating exactly what had happened (i.e. in the storyteller’s words). By avoiding answering the Lord God’s leading questions, he avoids implicating himself. Whether by so doing he displays extreme shrewdness (even cunning) or merely simple naivety cannot now be determined with certainty

25.29 … According to the storyteller (i.e. his 1st version), the man takes and eats the fruit without a word being spoken. Whether or not he takes and eats it without a thought is not known. Whether or not he knows from which tree the fruit he is eating is comes from is not stated in the story.1 Whether or not the man realizes that the fruit which he is eating comes from the forbidden tree and he then eats it to deliberately break the Lord God’s command is not stated in the story2

25.29.1. …This is crucial. Does the man know (i.e. see with open eyes, therefore ‘know’) that he is eating the fruit of the forbidden tree? If he is not aware that he is eating of the forbidden tree then his transgression (if any, and a specific transgression is not named by the storyteller, though asserted (but not proven) by the Lord God) merits mitigating circumstances.1 In other words, if the man is unaware of the fact that he is eating the fruit of the tree forbidden to him, then intentional transgression does not happen

25.29.2 … The storyteller does not state what the man’s intention is as he eats the fruit. However, Augustine, the consummate liar (nowadays called spin doctor), knows better. He invents, “Where God did nothing else than by a just sentence to condemn the man who wilfully sins,1 together with his stock; there also, as a matter of course, whatsoever was even not yet born is justly condemned in its sinful root.” It is not stated the man knows that he is eating the forbidden fruit. Nor is it stated that he ‘sins’ wilfully, i.e. that he eats the fruit to intentionally break the Lord God’s command (or obey his wife). The Lord God does not state, then or ever, that “whatsoever was even not yet born is justly condemned in its sinful root”. Augustine is not just loading the dice, i.e. by suggesting intentional wrongdoing on the part of the man, he is condemning all future generations of humans to damnation. Here Augustine is perverting both the truth and the course of justice, indeed, for all of humanity, at least until the (3rd) arrival of the Redeemer

25.29.2.1 … That wilful consent, hence deliberate intention, is required for sin (i.e. transgression) to happen1 is elsewhere clearly stated by Augustine: “But if reason consents and decides that what desire has stirred up should be carried out, man is expelled from the whole happy life as if from paradise. For the sin is already imputed to him, even if the deed is not carried out (!!!, my insertion), since conscience is held guilty by reason of the consent.” Whether or not the man and the woman are endowed with a conscience, or whether or not conscience ‘emerges’ after the forbidden fruit is eaten, is not stated in the story

25.29.2.1.1 … In ancient Hebrew times, wilful consent (i.e. deliberate intention) is not required for condemnation. Yahweh personally kills whole cities full of women and children who have become unintentional accessories to what He judges to be a crime. His absolutely merciless destruction of the women and children of Sodom and Gomorrah supports the view expressed above

25.30 … The storyteller does not state that the woman beguiles, tempts or seduces the man, or that she intends so to do. Nor does he state that the woman beguiles the man to perform a specific act (namely to eat deliberately of the forbidden tree in order to break the Lord God’s command). The claim made centuries later by religious fanatics that the woman (i.e. the help-as-counterpart, later renamed chavvah, meaning ‘Life’) functions as temptress and/or seductress is fiction. Tertullian’s flat assertion that all the daughters of Eve do likewise, thereby functioning as ‘the gateway to the devil, and which suggests transmission of an ‘original’ capacity for temptation and/or seduction, and which results in transgression and sin (and death), is malicious, indeed criminal religious tripe (i.e. criminal because it leads to criminal acts on a vast scale) by Christian clerics

25.31 …  The function of the help-as-counterpart, when first made, is not defined. It is stated that she is ‘made’ to help the man overcome the fact that he is ‘alone’ (though it is not stated that he is lonely). How she is to perform her function is not stated

25.32 … The story is absolutely silent on the woman’s motives or intentions.1 It is not stated that the woman gives of the fruit to the man to eat to deliberately tempt (or dare, i.e. prove) him to break the Lord God’s command, so that he would become ‘as the gods’. It appears more likely that she wants the man to acquire wisdom, i.e. because ‘to be wise’ is desirable (though it is not stated why ‘to be wise’ is desirable). However, the man does not express the desire ‘to be wise.’ Why the man eats the fruit is not known

25.32.1 … The spin doctor, Martin Luther, later writes, “This poison of Satan she drank with her ears; she stretched out her hand to the forbidden fruit; and she ate it with her mouth. And so she sins through all her senses of soul and body, and yet she is not aware of her sin. She eats the fruit with pleasure, and she urges her husband also to do the same.’ The storyteller does not state that she urges her husband to eat the fruit

25.33 … The storyteller does not state that the man recognises the fruit, nor, indeed, that he sees that eating of it will make him wise

25.34 … Nowhere in the story does the man express desire (either as chamad, meaning: covetousness, or as teshuwqah, meaning: longing or craving). It is not stated that he is formed with the capacity for desire, though desire is implied in that the Lord God grows the trees ‘pleasant to the sight’. The claim made centuries later that the man ‘desired’ and that ‘desire’ is the root cause of ‘sin’ is unfounded, malicious speculation

25.35 … The man does not ask for fruit. He does not ask the woman from which tree the fruit has been picked. There is no indication in the story that he has a preference for a particular fruit. He simply takes the fruit in silence, and in silence eats

25.36 … This is absolutely crucial. Since the man does not state at any time that he wants to become ‘as the gods’, or even as the Lord God, all accusations that suggest the former are unverifiable allegations

25.37 … Nowhere in the story, prior to his ‘sending forth’, does the man express (or act out) desire (Hebrew: teshuwqah, meaning: longing or craving) for the woman, his help-as-counterpart. Nor does the Lord God later on sentence the man to have desire for the woman. Moreover, the Lord God does not proscribe either of the two forms of desire, both of which appear to be desire of the senses. Centuries later, the Lord God will proscribe desire for the neighbour’s property (i.e. in the 10th Commandment)

25.38 … This is crucial. The man’s intention, if any, is not stated, either by himself or by the storyteller. It is not stated that he eats the fruit because he wants to ‘be as God’ or to ‘be as the gods’ or to be as the Lord God. It is not stated that he deliberately eats the fruit to demonstrated his free will; nor that he seeks to be disobedient or demonstrate rebelliousness, and so on. It is not stated that he knows what he is eating. Whether or not the man eats the fruit with deliberate intent1 or ‘by mistake’, or because he always eats the fruit which the woman gives him (i.e. because he obeys her), is not known. Later attempts to superimpose a reason (or intent or motive) on the man are wild speculation2

25.38.1 … Augustine fantasizes, “The deliberate sin of the first man is the cause of Original Sin.” How deliberate the first man’s act of eating of the fruit which the woman gives him (and which may or may not have come form the forbidden tree) is, is not stated by the storyteller. If he eats the fruit, for instance to please his helpmate,1 then, quite obviously, he does not sin, at least not according to Augustine’s understanding, and which requires that the man intends to deliberately break the Lord God’s command

25.38.2 … Augustine invents a rather inane reason why the man eats the fruit. He fumbles, “… but that he by the drawings of kindred yielded to the woman, the husband to the wife, the one human being to the only other human being.” Elsewhere he drags Paul into his free speculation with some truly cool spin. He writes, “For not without significance did the apostle say, “And Adam was not deceived (by whom ??), but the woman being deceived was in the transgression;” but he speaks thus, because the woman accepted as true what the serpent told her (it is not stated in the story that the woman accepted what the serpent had told her as true, my insertion), but the man could not bear to be severed from his only companion, even though this involved a partnership in sin. He was not on this account less culpable, but sinned with his eyes open.”1 All the former is the stuff of fantasy. Augustine invents false evidence, and which he later ‘plants’ to prove the man’s guilt, indeed the fundamental guilt of all humans. The man’s guilt, renamed as ‘sin,’ is later transmitted, so Augustine, in the man’s (and every man’s) semen to all his offspring, thereby infecting all with his guilt. In short, all are born guilty (i.e. of the adam’s sin (read: crime).2 The ‘presumption of guilt’ which Augustine finalizes, rather than invents, is an offer which the Pope cannot refuse, since it provides the latter with the BIG STICK, in other words, with the rationale for absolute power (and the means wherewith to establish the world’s most successful protection racket)

25.38.2.1 … The man’s eyes are opened (perhaps his conscience activated) and he ‘knows’ only after he has eaten of the fruit, not before. Augustine’s reasoning, if not reading, is way off the mark (hence sinful (Greek: hamartia), that is to say, in Paul’s language)

25.38.2.2 … Augustine writes, ‘The guilt, therefore, of that corruption of which we are speaking will remain in the carnal offspring of the regenerate, until in them also it be washed away in the laver of regeneration.”

25.39 … The story is silent on both the man’s and the woman’s mental (and physical) capacities and of their range, and/or their state of maturity.1 It is not stated how old the pair are, nor how naïve (or shrewd) or even thoughtless (or thoughtful) they are. Since nothing is known about what either the man or the woman think, imagine, feel, hope or desire, or how aware they are, making an accurate, fair and final judgement1 of their actions, and which could (some people think, should) include giving them the ‘benefit of the doubt’, not to mention the ‘presumption of innocence’ (and which neither the Lord God nor His Christian Church, specifically the office of the Grand Inquisitor, lately so ably guided by Joe Ratzinger, are prepared to give), is not possible

25.39.1 … Rather than provide an unambiguous statement regarding the man and the woman’s intention to break the Lord God’s command, and which the storyteller or a later redactor could have inserted quite easily, i.e. with a single word, the storyteller describes a sequence of acts resulting from misinformation, misunderstandings, carelessness, day-dreaming, lack of forethought and poor communication. What the storyteller is describing (and this is my personal opinion) is the state of the normal (immature or adolescent) human, who gradually, but unintentionally, ‘paints himself into a corner’. Idem Yahweh

25.40 … It is obvious that the woman had become more subtle before she picks and eats the fruit of the tree which she qualifies (and hence calls, hence names) as ‘to be desired to make one wise’

25.41 … Once again Augustine knows what both the storyteller and the Lord God do not know, namely, “Our first parents fell into open disobedience because already they were secretly corrupted (Wow!!!!, my insertion); for the evil act had never been done had not an evil will preceded it. And what is the origin of our evil will but pride? For “pride is the beginning of sin”.” Nowhere in the story is it stated that the man and the woman have ‘an evil will’ (i.e. malicious intent) or that they are ‘secretly corrupted’, or that they are ‘proud,’ or, moreover, that eating of the forbidden tree is an ‘evil act.’ The pack of lies which Augustine is here planting will, during the next 1200 years, have disastrous consequences for the peoples of Europe

25.42 … Much more can be dug out of this sentence. Why not have a go! This is your chance to show how perceptive you have become

 

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