The Adam & Eve
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Genesis 3:6 (Section 25): “And when the woman saw
that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and
that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of its fruit and
ate; and she also gave some to her husband, and he ate.”
+ And (when) the woman saw that the tree
was good for food,
+ and that it was a delight to the eyes,
+ and
that the tree was to be desired to make one wise,1
+ she took of its fruit and ate;
+ and she also gave some to her husband2
(with her?3)
+ and he ate.
–
The
storyteller does not identify the tree which the woman sees as the tree of the
knowledge of good and bad4
–
It is
not stated that the woman goes to the (unidentified) tree because of what the
serpent has says5
–
The
time lag between the woman’s conversation with the serpent and the moment she
sees the (unidentified) tree is not given6
–
How
the woman sees7 when her eyes are not yet open is not stated8
–
How
the woman sees ‘that the tree is good for food’, when she has not yet
acquired the knowledge of good and bad, is a mystery9
–
The
storyteller states that the woman ‘sees that the tree was to be desired to make
(one) wise’
–
It is
not stated how the woman is able to see that the tree can make (one) wise10
–
It is
not stated why to be wise is worthy of desire
–
The
storyteller does not explain what is meant by ‘wise’11
–
It is
not stated that to be wise is the same as having the knowledge of good and bad12
–
The
storyteller does not state that the woman sees that the tree will provide the
knowledge of good and bad13
–
It is
not stated by the storyteller that the woman sees that by eating of the tree
she will become ‘as the gods’ or ‘as God’, nor, indeed, as the Lord God14
–
It is
not stated by the storyteller or the woman that she wants become ‘as the gods’
or ‘as God’, nor, indeed, as the Lord God15
–
It is
not stated that the woman eats the fruit because of what the serpent says16
–
Whether
or not the serpent is present when the woman takes the fruit and eats it is not
stated
–
It is
not stated that the Lord God is present as the woman eats of the tree17
–
Whether
or not the woman is tempted by her desire for wisdom is not stated18
–
The
woman does not state why she eats of the tree19
–
The
woman introduces the notion of desire20
–
The
Lord God does not condemn desire21
–
It is
clearly stated that ‘the woman sees the tree’. Therefore it could be concluded
that she is alone22
–
Whether
or not the man is present as she takes and eats the fruit is not stated23
–
It is
not stated that the woman, having eaten of the tree, reacts with fear (or
shame)24
–
Having
eaten of the tree, the woman does not die,25 i.e. in the day
–
Having
eaten of the (unidentified) tree, the woman does not state that she has become
wise
–
The
storyteller does not state that the woman, having eating of the tree, has
‘seen’ (or acquired) the knowledge of good and bad26
–
The
time lag between the moment when the woman eats the fruit (and nothing happens)
and the moment when she gives of the fruit to the man, now ‘with her’, and he
eats thereof (and something happens to both), is not given27
–
The
storyteller does not state that the woman speaks to the man as she gives him
the fruit to eat and he eats28
–
It is
not stated that the man recognises that the fruit which the woman gives him
comes from the tree ‘that is to be desired to make one wise’, nor, indeed, that
it is the fruit of the tree of which the Lord God has commanded him not to eat
on pain of ‘death in the day’29
–
It is
not stated that the woman encourages the man to eat the fruit, or that she
dares or challenges him; nor is it stated that she temps or seduces him to eat.
She simply gives him the fruit, i.e. when he is with her, apparently in silence,
and he eats30
–
Whether
or not picking fruit is the woman’s task, i.e. as help-as-counterpart, is not
stated31
–
The
fruit is not named
–
The
woman does not state her reason for giving some of the fruit to the man to eat32
–
It is
not stated that the man sees that the fruit ‘is to be desired to make one wise’33
–
It is
not stated that the man desires, hence is ‘tempted’ by the fruit34
given to him by the woman35
–
The
man does not state that he desires to be wise
–
It is
not stated that the man desires to be ‘as the gods’ or ‘as God’, nor, indeed,
as the Lord God36
–
It is
not stated that the man desires the woman37
–
The
reason why the man eats the fruit which the woman gives him (in silence) is not
stated38
–
It is
not stated how subtle the man and the woman are,39 or if the woman,
having eaten of the tree, is (now) more subtle (i.e. wiser) than the man40
–
The
storyteller does not state that the man and the woman eat the fruit of the
forbidden tree to intentionally break the Lord God’s command to the man41
–
… and
so on and on42
÷
25.1 … The term ‘wise’ is
translated from the Hebrew term sakal (Strong 07919) meaning: to be
(causatively, make or act) circumspect and hence, intelligent; consider,
expert, instruct, prosper, (deal) prudent(-ly), (give) skill(-ful), have good
success, teach, (have, make to) understand(-ing), wisdom, (be, behave self,
consider, make) wise(- ly), guide wittingly. Take your pick1,2
25.1.1 … This crucial verse
fragment, “and that the tree was to be desired to make (one) wise”,
is missing from both the Septuagint and the Vulgate. The Hebrews who translate
this verse fragment alter it to read, “and beautiful to contemplate.” The
deliberate Septuagint error is translated in the Vulgate as “and delightful to
behold.” This is a very serious corruption of the original story. Why the
Septuagint translators choose to introduce this deception is not known.1
25.1.1.1 … Since it appears
that Paul reads the Septuagint rather than the original Hebrew text, he would
not have known that desire is included in the story and, more importantly, that
desire is not condemned by Yahweh God. Whether or not this error is part
of the original Septuagint (it is included in the Aramaic Targums of Jonathan1
and Onqelos) or is inserted later into Christian translations into Greek of the
original Hebrew text, hence into pseudo Septuagints, is not known2
25.1.1.1.1 … The Targum of
Jonathan reads, “And the woman saw Sammael the angel of death and she was
afraid. She knew that the tree was good to eat, and that it was a cure for
the light of her eyes, and that the tree was desirable as a source of wisdom.”
It is interesting to not that the tree which the woman sees is qualified as
(hence called) ‘a source of wisdom’ rather than a source of the knowledge of
good and bad
25.1.1.1.2 … Research has
shown that eventually three (possibly five) versions of the Septuagint are
produced, i.e. two before Christianity emerged and three thereafter. That
several versions of the Septuagint were in circulation is shown by the fact
that the verse fragment, “, … yet your desire was (or is) for your husband” is
quoted by Philo of Alexandria (hence is a quotation from his pre-Christian era
Septuagint version), but is missing from the Septuagint version translated by
Brenton (in 1851 A.D.)1 and from Jerome’s Vulgate2
25.1.1.1.2.1 … Why a
Christian translator would have removed references to desire, both as
covetousness (Hebrew: chamad, meaning: to desire, covet, take pleasure
in, take delight in (Strong 02530)) and as desire, presumably of the flesh
(Hebrew: (Hebrew: teshuwqah: meaning: (desire), longing,
craving (Strong 08669)), from the story is obvious.1 The fact that
the Lord God apparently ‘makes’ the woman with the capacity for desire (as
covetousness, for instance of wisdom) and then sentences the woman to have
desire (presumably physical longing), albeit for her husband, scuppers Paul’s
blanket (hence universal and absolute) but prohibition of (unspecified)
covetousness, i.e. as desire (Hebrew: chamad), and of desire of the
flesh (Hebrew, teshuwqah) put forward (i.e. Rom 7:7) via his
deliberate misquotation of the 10th Commandment, namely, “ Thou
shalt not covet!”
25.1.1.1.2.1.1 … Both
references to desire (German: Begehren) are still missing from Luther’s
Bible translation of 1534, though he does offered a garbled version of this
verse, namely, “/das ein lustiger bawm were/weil er klug mechte/…”, and which
translates as, “… that it was a merry, gay or happy (possibly delightful) tree,
because it made clever (or wise)” Consequently both Luther’s and Paul’s interpretations
of desire, and of its divinely installed and/or superimposed function and
purpose, are seriously compromised
25.1.1.1.2.2 … Augustine’s
Pentateuch source is unknown. He does not appear to use the Septuagint or
Vulgate versions of this story since he quotes (indeed misquotes, i.e. in his
book, Against the Manichees), “And the woman saw,” it says, “that the tree was
good for food and that it was good for the eyes for seeing and knowing”.”
Whether or not Augustine mistranslates the verse fragment deliberately in order
to remove the word ‘desire’ (Hebrew: chamad, meaning: to desire, covet,
take pleasure in, take delight in) is not known. Later on, he again succeeds in
eliminating the word ‘desire’ (Hebrew: teshuwqah, meaning:
longing or craving) from the story when he deliberately mistranslates,
“Scripture adds after the birth, “You will turn to (rather than
desire, my insertion) your man, and he will rule over you.” Do not many or
almost all women give birth while their husbands are absent and, after birth,
turn to them?” By twice removing the word desire, Augustine can sustain his
invective against the (sensual) pleasures (hence sins) of the flesh. This is
serious deception
25.1.2 … The introduction into
the narrative by the storyteller of the highly ambiguous term ‘wise’ is strange
indeed. Had the storyteller said, “… and that the tree was to be desired to
make one know good and bad”, then the subsequent events and the final moral of
the story would have been clear-cut and compelling. As it is told by the
storyteller, this verse in no way indicates with absolute certainty that the
tree which the woman sees, and from which she eats, and whose fruit she gives
to the man to eat, is in fact the tree of the knowledge of good and bad. It
could just as well have been the tree of life,1 or, indeed a
different tree altogether. It appears that the verse fragment, “… and that the
tree was to be desired to make (one) wise”, is inserted later to add irrelevant
and uncertain content1 to the story to complicate it further by
merely appearing to spin it towards the ‘crime and punishment’ super-plot
25.1.2.1 … There is a
serious difficulty here. Augustine writes, “So that the tree of life would seem
to have been in the terrestrial Paradise what the wisdom of God is in the
spiritual, of which it is written, “She is a tree of life to them that lay hold
upon her”.” Later on, Gregory of Nyssa writes in the same vein, “ … and
Solomon, when he names Wisdom herself (which is the Lord) ‘a tree of life’.” If
wisdom is associated with the tree of life, then it is at least possible that
the woman sees the tree of life and the picks its fruit. After all, the
storyteller does not state that she picks the fruit of the tree of the knowledge
of good and bad. Why he does not do so is quite a mystery, unless the whole
story is far more complex than even Christian interpreters suggest1
25.1.2.1.1 … It is quite
possible (and I’m speculating here!) that the final version of the story was
arrived at in three stages (and several minor, politically motivated
redactions). It all started with a simple passage narrative. However, it was
later deemed necessary to explain how the passage (i.e. from infancy to puberty
(i.e. from nakedness to being clothed) came to happen. However, it was also
deemed necessary to fudge the actual driver of change, thereby leaving several
options for change open. Later on, it was decided that what was needed was a
‘crime and punishment’ story that purported to explain the origin of sin (and
of evil), and that blame had to be shifted away from the contemporary laity to
a ‘fall guy’ (i.e. scapegoat’. That’s when the cursing and the ‘driving out’
(i.e. suggesting a violent expulsion after the man had already been sent forth)
fragments were added to the (merely apparent) sentences
25.1.2.2 … Mathematicians
would consider the addition of uncertain (or indefinite) content as the
addition of an infinity, and which makes resolution of the problem impossible
(i.e. unending). In short, the addition of not just this uncertain statement to
the story (plus several more uncertain statements included in this verse)
serves to make the story (indeed myth) more uncertain, thereby deepening the
trance (or enchantment, i.e. the ‘down time’) of the listener or reader. There
is quite exquisite meaning (i.e. purpose, and which intents to freeze (i.e. to
mental (and physical) catalepsy) the listener or reader to enable installation
of programming, hence manipulation) to this madness
25.2 … In the original
Hebrew the fragment reads: “…; she also gave some to her1 husband2
with her.”
25.2.1 … The use of the
possessive pronoun ‘her’ is strange indeed. After all, only one man has been
formed and possession cannot yet have been an issue. The sudden appearance of
the possessive pronoun suggest strongly that this verse fragment (indeed the
whole verse) is a later insertion
25.2.2 … In the original
text, the Hebrew term ish, meaning man, is used. Why the term ish
is here translated as ‘husband’ rather than as man is not known
25.3 … The literal
translation goes, “… and she gave some to her husband with her”.1
Whether or not the man is with her when she first goes to the tree and takes of
its fruit and eats it is uncertain.2 However, the fact the
storyteller states, “… and (when) the woman saw that the tree, etc, …”, rather
than “… and (when) they saw that the tree, etc, …”, suggests that the man is
not present
25.3.3.1 … Had this verse
fragment been presented as a separate verse, as, indeed, many other whole
verses (i.e. complete memes or contexts) were split up in order to break up the
context, thereby changing its meaning, then the meaning of this verse fragment
might have been more clearly established
25.3.3.2 … The time lag
between the moment when the woman eats the fruit and (later on, or elsewhere,
and when he is described as being ‘with her’) gives some to ‘her husband’ and
he eats it is not given. In short, it is not stated that the woman goes to the
tree with the man. Nor is it stated that she gives the man the fruit to eat
immediately after she has done so, and beneath or near the tree. It is not
stated precisely when (or where) she gives the man the fruit. This is crucial
circumstantial evidence. After all, the man, when interrogated, does not
confirm that he knew precisely which fruit he was given to eat
25.4 … This is a quite
extraordinary and crucial omission. The fact that the storyteller does not
state that she goes to ‘the midst of the garden’ (and where she claims,
wrongly, that the forbidden tree is grown), and the fact that the tree which
the woman sees is not identified as the tree of the knowledge of good and bad1
either by the storyteller or her,2 opens up a can or worms. Whether
both omissions are intentional or the result of sloppy editing or forgery
cannot now be determined
25.4.1 … It is not
absolutely certain that the woman goes to the tree of the knowledge of good and
bad, sees it and eats of it. After all, in her conversation with the serpent
the woman refers to the tree in the midst of the garden, and which is the tree
of life. Neither the storyteller nor the Lord God provides a description either
of the tree of life or of the tree of the knowledge of good and bad, or of
their fruit. Whether or not she picks and eats the fruit of the tree forbidden
to the man (but not to her…. recall that the storyteller does not state that
the Lord God commands her not to eat of the tree) is not certain. It is
generally assumed that she picks the fruit of the tree forbidden to the man and
gives some of it to him to eat. However, that assumption can neither be
verified nor falsified,1,2 therefore used as direct (i.e. hard)
evidence
25.4.1.1 … There is huge
uncertainty here since, having eaten of the tree, the pair merely ‘know that
they are naked.’ The storyteller does not state that the pair acquire the
knowledge of good and bad but merely the knowledge of nakedness. Later on, i.e.
during interrogation, neither the man nor the woman claims (or confess) to having
acquired the knowledge of good and bad. The man admits to the knowledge of
nakedness. Whether or not the knowledge of nakedness is the same as the
knowledge of good, or bad, or of both or neither, is not stated. The
storyteller does not state that having eaten they become ‘wise.’ Nor does he
state that they are ashamed after they have eaten of the tree
25.4.1.2 … If the Lord God’s
part statement (in verse 11) is accepted as authentic, and true, namely,
“but of the tree of the knowledge of good and bad you shall not eat, for in the
day that you eat of it you shall die”, then the fact that the man does not die
not only ‘proves’ that the fruit which he ate did not come from the forbidden
tree but that the woman actually picked the fruit of the tree of life growing
in the midst of the garden
25.4.2 … The woman
identifies the tree as, “… good for food, and that it was a delight to the
eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, …’, whereby she
does not explain what she means by ‘wise’.1 Whether this is an exact
description of the tree of the knowledge of good and bad is anybody’s guess
25.4.2.1 … This opens up
another can of worms (or casket of diamonds). Does ‘wise’ mean the same for
both the help-as-counterpart and her counterpart, the adam? If it is
assumed, and this is speculation, that the adam becomes ‘wise’ by eating
of the tree of the knowledge of good and bad, then it is highly likely that his
help-as-counterpart, and who is, being a women, fundamentally different from
him, rather than merely an opposite, i.e. a differential of identical capacity,
might seek the ‘wisdom’ which the tree of life (read: initiation into her
reproductive function) would offer, the more so the ancient Hebrews understood
knowledge (and, presumably, the wisdom that results from relativized knowledge)
to be primary experience. What interest, indeed, would the counterpart have in
the adam’s wisdom (read: experience), and vice versa1
25.4.2.1.1 … Centuries
later, Christian priests will not just devalue, but debase, even demonize
women’s wisdom, simply because they don’t understand (or want to understand) it
because it is so unlike and contrary to their own (hence operating as genuine
counterpart, just as the Lord God had made it)
25.5 … The storyteller does
not state that the woman is beguiled, tricked, hypnotised1 or
tempted2 by what the serpent says and that that is the reason why
she goes to and picks and eats of the (unspecified) tree
25.5.1 … The woman later
claims, possibly in her defence, possibly as a statement of fact or of her
belief), that she was ‘beguiled’ (Hebrew: nasha) by the serpent i.e. by
what the serpent says. Strong (05377) interprets nasha to mean: to lead
astray, i.e. (mentally) to delude, or (morally) to seduce: beguile, deceive, X
greatly, X utterly). However, Young interprets, hence translates the effect
which the serpent’s words have on her as, “The serpent hath caused me to
forget”, and which suggests if not hypnotism then at least as mental
misdirection (such as practiced with consummate skill by Paul, Augustine and
Luther1 and, indeed the original teller of this story). That the
woman could be beguiled by the truth, for it turns out that the serpent speaks
the truth (almost), that it so say, what ‘the gods know’, is a bit of a mystery
25.5.1.1 … Luther, or the
editor of the 2nd edition of his Bible translation of 1545,
demonstrates his proclivity for unconscionable mental misdirection by
introducing false, i.e. wholly misleading chapter headings (e.g. ‘the fall into
sin’, though neither ‘fall’ nor ‘sin’ are mentioned in the story) into his
German translation (now, because corrupted, a version) of the story of Adam and
Eve. The purpose of these bogus chapter headings is obvious. They serve to
create skewed (to his view) tunnel vision. The fact that Luther adds ‘letters’,
indeed false ones, to the Bible indicates a sheer unbelievable disrespect for
this (allegedly) ‘holy’ book
25.5.2 … If a temptation
(read: a ‘proving’) situation is set up, then it is done by the Lord God when
he first forms all the tree ‘good for food and pleasant to the sight’, then
commands him to eat of all of them, then forbids the man not to eat from one of
them.1 The Lord God does not forbid the woman to eat from the tree
of the knowledge of good and bad. The storyteller states that the woman is
‘drawn’ (i.e. tempted, in the modern sense of the word) to eat of ‘the tree in
the midst of the garden’ because by her desire (or covetousness) to be wise
(rather than acquire the knowledge of good and bad). It is not stated that she
feels tempted (i.e. to ‘prove’ herself) to become ‘as God’, or ‘as the gods’ or
even as the Lord God. It is not stated that she seeks (i.e. intends, or is
tempted) to break the Lord God’s command in order to demonstrate her
independence, i.e. her freedom of will, and, indeed, her pride2
25.5.2.1 … Recall Philo’s
difficulty when he tries to interpret this verse (actually verses 10 & 11).
He writes, ““But of the tree of the knowledge of good
and evil ye (sic!) shall not eat.” Therefore this tree is not in the Paradise.
For God encourages them (sic!) to eat of every tree that is in the Paradise.
But when he forbids them to eat of this tree, it is plain that it is not in the
Paradise; and this is in accordance with natural philosophy.” There is in fact
no direct evidence that the tree of the knowledge of good and bad is grown in
the garden. That the tree of life is grown in the garden is specifically stated
in verse 3, and suggested in verses 42 and 43
25.5.2.2 … Augustine
speculates as to why the forbidden fruit is eaten, albeit in relation to the
man: “but if he offended the Lord his God by a proud and disobedient use of his
free will, he should become subject to death, and live as the beasts do, the
slave of appetite, and doomed to eternal punishment after death.” That is not
in the story
25.6 … Later interpreters of
the story suggest that the woman goes immediately to the midst of (but possibly
into) the garden to eat of the tree that grown in its midst, and which they
assume is the forbidden tree, though the storyteller does not identify it as
such. Whether or not the woman goes to the tree, and which is clearly described
by the woman, but not as the tree of the knowledge of good and bad)
immediately, an hour, a day or a month later, or when she happens to come
across it (possibly because it grows amidst the tress rather than in their
midst), is not known with certainty. However, knowing the time lag (and,
indeed, the change of location from the place where the conversation between
the serpent and the woman took place) would provide circumstantial evidence
(albeit weak) as to how effective the serpent’s alleged beguiling was
25.7 … The storyteller does
not explain how the woman ‘sees’ that ‘the tree is good for food’.1
The English word see is the translation of the Hebrew word ra'ah,
meaning; to see, literally or figuratively (in numerous applications, direct
and implied, transitive, intransitive and causative); advise self, appear,
approve, behold, X certainly, consider, discern, (make to) enjoy, have
experience, gaze, take heed, lo , look and so on. After all, it is assumed (but
not proven) that she has not eaten of the forbidden tree, and which would have
allowed her to distinguish, in fact ‘know’ (the abstract, and indeed, relative
concepts of) good and bad
25.7.1 … Recall that in
verse 3 “… the Lord God made to grow every three that is pleasant to the sight
and good for food, …”, then proceeds to command the man to eat of all of the
trees in the garden, but not of the tree of the knowledge of good and bad (and which
may or may not be growing in the garden). Verse 3 does not suggest that the man
needs to ‘see’ that the trees are ‘good for food’, hence does not need to be
able to distinguish between (i.e. have the knowledge of) good and bad. This is
crucial.
25.8 … When the storyteller
states, “… and when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and
that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make
one wise, ..”, it is not made clear by him to which set of ‘eyes’ the woman
uses. In all, the woman uses three sets of eyes, namely the set that allows her
to negotiate her way around the garden, the set that allows her to (physically)
see the various (abstract) qualities of the (unspecified, i.e. (hence) unnamed)
tree1 and the set of eyes that ‘open’2 after she eats of
the fruit and ‘knows’ that she is naked
25.8.1 … The fact that the
woman is able to ‘see’ (hence understand via conscious, physical
discrimination) the abstract qualities of the (otherwise unspecified) tree
indicates that the first question which the Lord God puts to the man (in verse
30) namely, “Who told you that you were naked?” is extremely meaningful. If the
initial fragment of this verse is linked to the Lord God’s first (therefore
quite possibly the more important) question to the man, then it does appear
that the knowledge of good and bad, insofar as it is the acquire (or activated)
capacity to distinguish relativities, can be acquired by word of mouth (i.e.
for instance via a conversation with a serpent). That might suggest that the
conversation with the serpent has activated her capacity to distinguish (i.e.
‘see’) particular relativities (to wit, good and bad)
25.8.2 … Whether or not
‘opening of the eyes’, and which results in knowing (Hebrew: yada, meaning,
to know1) is equivalent to awakening or emerging of a consciousness
that distinguishes (abstract) relatives is not stated
25.8.2.1 … The precise
meaning of the Hebrew term, yada (Strong 3045) is uncertain. Its
semantic elasticity is extraordinary. Yada is translated to mean, to
know (properly, to ascertain by seeing); used in a great variety of senses,
figuratively, literally, euphemistically and inferentially (including
observation, care, recognition; and causatively, instruction, designation, punishment,
etc.) (as follow): acknowledge, acquaintance(-ted with), advise, answer,
appoint, assuredly, be aware, (un-)awares, can(-not), certainly, comprehend,
consider, X could they, cunning, declare, be diligent, (can, cause to) discern,
discover, endued with, familiar friend, famous, feel, can have, be (ig-)norant,
instruct, kinsfolk, kinsman, (cause to let, make) know, (come to give, have,
take) knowledge, have (knowledge), (be, make, make to be, make self) known, +
be learned, + lie by man, mark, perceive, privy to, X prognosticator, regard,
have respect, skilful, shew, can (man of) skill, be sure, of a surety, teach,
(can) tell, understand, have (understanding), X will be, wist, wit, wot.
Moreover, since yada is also used in verse 44 to describe the means
whereby the adam ‘knew’ his ‘wife’, thereby getting her pregnant, yada
can also mean, copulate, have sexual intercourse and so on. Take your pick!
25.9 …That the woman
actually ‘sees’ that ‘the tree is good for food’, hence has the capacity to
physically discriminate between good and bad, suggests that she has either
eaten of the tree of the knowledge of good and bad, probably outside the
garden, and where she appears to have encountered the serpent (that is to say,
if the ‘living of the field’ are excluded from the garden, therefore requiring
the man to guard it) (my opinion), or she has been stimulated by the serpent to
discriminate, that later existing outside the garden where not all trees and
plants, and, indeed, other living of the field’ are ‘good for food’,1
thereby activating her capacity to make distinctions (specifically between good
and bad). There is serious uncertainty here
25.9.1 … There may be
(albeit weak) circumstantial evidence here that the tree of the knowledge of
good and bad is grown outside the garden and, moreover, not prohibited to the
‘living of the field.’ After all, the ‘living of the field’ would have needed
to be able to distinguish good from bad in order to survive. Ensconced in the
garden, the man would not have needed the knowledge of good and bad. The
storyteller does not state that the woman is ‘put’ (and possibly kept) in the
garden
25.10 … There is a massive
problem, indeed contradiction here. How the woman can physically see, rather
than mentally know (i.e. as she will later know that she is naked), that to be
wise, of which she has no knowledge (or experience), is desirable,1
is a mystery. After all, the serpent did not initiate her to wisdom but merely
told her what ‘the gods know’
25.10.1 … The Lord God does
not describe either one of the two special trees as ‘to be desired to make one
wise’. If it is inferred from the scant detail related by the storyteller,
namely that life in and around the garden is pretty basic (i.e. naïve, to wit,
‘naked’), then the sudden desire ‘to be wise’,1 and which is a very
sophisticated desire, specifically if up till then desire for fruit that is ‘a
delight to the eyes’ is all that the woman desired (it is not stated that she
desires the adam),2 simply does not fit into the narrative
25.10.1.1 … There appears to
be no link between the conversation between the serpent and the woman, and
which appears to refer to the tree of the knowledge of good and bad and of its
affect, and the woman’s desire to be wise. Hence it might be inferred that this
verse fragment is a later text corruption inserted for not unknown (or denied)
reason1
25.10.1.1.1 … As late as 650
A.D., Maximos (i.e. the Confessor) writes, no doubt taking his cue from
Augustine and the Hebrew prophets, “The tree of life, when understood as
symbolizing wisdom,1 likewise differs greatly from the tree of the
knowledge of good and bad, in that the latter neither symbolizes wisdom nor is
said to do so.” Elsewhere he gives a fine example of excellent religious cult
logic when he writes, “ Undoubtedly, the tree of life is productive of life;
the tree that is not called the tree of life, and so is not productive of life,
is obviously productive of death. For only death is the opposite of life.”
Maximos quite obviously did not read the story. Death happens not because the
tree of the knowledge of good and bad is eaten but because the adam is
prevented from outing of it
25.10.1.1.1.1 … Since
ancient times, wisdom has been deemed to be one of the qualities of the tree of
life. Whether this understanding is derived from this verse fragment or comes
from a non-biblical source is not known to me. However, since wisdom is
associated with (or symbolized by, according to Maximos), the tree of life,
then it appears that the woman sees, and eats from, the tree of life and not
from the tree of the knowledge of good and bad
25.10.1.2 … The storyteller
does not state anywhere in his story that the man or the woman express desire
to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and bad. At no time does the man
express a desire to be wise. It is not stated in the story that the man ever
sees either the tree of life or the tree of the knowledge of good and bad.
Furthermore, it is not stated by the storyteller that the man ever eats of
either the tree of life or of the tree of the knowledge of good and bad. That
the man has eaten of the latter tree is a claim made later by the Lord God, a
claim derived from very weak circumstantial evidence and not validated by the
man. The man merely states that he ate the fruit which the woman gave him. He
does not confirm that he knew which fruit that was
25.11 … Whether or not ‘to
be wise’ means the same to the woman as it does to the man and/or to the Lord
God is not stated1
25.11.1 … Whether the wisdom
that appeals to the woman is the wisdom (or experience) of life, i.e. as
reproduction, and which, perhaps, the fruit of the tree of life provides, or it
is the wisdom which the tree of the knowledge of good and bad provides, and
which, possibly, would have appealed to the man (though he does not desire it),
is not stated1
25.11.1.1 … After all, the
woman is ‘made’ as help-as-counterpart, hence is provided with functions and
characteristics (fundamentally) different from the man. In other words, it
(i.e. the counterpart, later described as ‘she’) is not made as another man
(and who would act as a counterpart because opposite but not different), hence
cannot be expected to respond as a man. This is crucial circumstantial evidence
25.12 … Whether or not the
term sakal (i.e. translated as wisdom or prudence) means the same to the
ancient Hebrews as the term ‘wise’ means to Paul, Augustine and Luther is not
known
25.13 … This is quite
extraordinary. The fact that the storyteller (or a later redactor) has the
woman describe what she sees (rather than knows), namely that the tree “was to
be desired to make one wise” rather than that it ‘was to be desired to give one
the knowledge of good and bad’, and which would have closed out the story,
introduces terminal uncertainty (i.e. an endless (i.e. infinitely) open
question) into this didactic parable (i.e. fairy tale)
25.14 … This is crucial
omission. It is not stated that the woman (physically) ‘sees (rather than
knows) that the tree is to be desired in order to become as the gods’ (or even
as the Lord God). It is not stated, indeed not even suggested, that eating of
this tree will result in becoming ‘as the gods’
25.15 … This is another
crucial omission. The early Church Fathers, taking their lead from Paul, who
appears to have taken his’ from very late Hebrew interpretation of this story,
assume that the woman eats of the (unidentified) tree because she wants to ‘be
as God’, meaning that she wants to be as Yahweh God, and that pride
drives her desire. Neither the storyteller nor the woman confirms that
assumption. The woman gives her reasons for eating of the (unidentified, but
for her description) tree. Providing reasons for eating of the tree, i.e. other
than those which the woman provides, is speculation
25.16 … The storyteller or a
later redactor would not have had a problem inserting a verse fragment that
creates a direct link between what the serpent says and what the woman does; in
short, a statement that makes absolutely clear (i.e. certain) that the woman’s
act of eating from the (unidentified) tree results directly from what the
serpent says. However, no such link is made in the story
25.17 … The Lord God later
asserts, i.e. in verse 36, that “Because you have listened to the voice of your1
wife…”. It is not stated how the Lord God arrives at His knowledge since He
appears not to have been present when the woman picks the fruit and eats it,
and when He might have intervened to stop her later on. Nor is it stated that
the Lord God is present when the woman gives some of the fruit to the man (now
with her) to eat, and when He might have stopped the man from committing
suicide2
25.17.1 … Note the
introduction of the possessive pronoun ‘your’. Since the man and his
counterpart are alone, the notion of possession (and therefore the use of the
possessive pronoun) would have been absurd. This suggests that this verse
fragment is later insertion
25.17.2 … Why the woman,
and, indeed, the Lord God (and of whom it is asserted that he ‘foresees’ all,
and which is obviously wrong) should have put the man’s life at risk is not
known. It is not known why the woman believes, or chooses to believe, that what
the serpent tells her about what the gods know is true
25.18 … That the woman eats
of the tree because of her desire to be wise is strongly suggested because of
how she regards the tree. That she eats of the tree to deliberately break the
Lord God’s command is an unverifiable assumption.1 To what extent
her capacity for desire is active, i.e. before the Lord God sentences her to
desire, albeit for her ‘husband’, is not known. Whether or not she desires the adam
before the Lord God passes His sentence on her is not stated in the story
25.18.1 … That the woman
eats of the tree because of what the serpent said is unverifiable. That the woman
eats of the tree to deliberately break the Lord God’s command to the man is not
stated in the story, therefore is an unverifiable assumption. That the woman
eats of the tree in order to become ‘as the gods’ or even as the Lord God is
also an unverifiable assumption. During interrogation, the woman does not admit
(i.e. confess) to desiring either to break the Lord God’s command or to be ‘as
the gods’ or as the Lord God
25.19 … This is crucial.
Since the woman does not give her true reason (or reasons) for eating from the
tree, save that she claims that the serpent beguiled her (whatever that means),
all reasons invented later by religious fiction writers are unverifiable
assumptions. Assumptions are not facts, that is to say, they are not hard, i.e.
‘safe and sound’ evidence. That religious fiction, i.e. Rel-fi writers, such as
Paul, Augustine and Luther, and who function as ‘expert witnesses,’ or so both
Protestant and Catholic Communions claim, pass off their assumptions as facts
is serious cheating, indeed perjury. Those who use the unfounded assumptions of
these three seriously misguided religious fiction writers as premises to
support their ‘presumption of guilt’ view, later established as absolutely true
via Augustine’s unproven Original Sin theory, indulge in pernicious deception
25.20 … It is not known how
the woman discovers or develops (or merely activates) desire. That she would
have had desire for food, that is to say, to eat of the trees that are grown
‘pleasant to the sight’, is obvious. It is not stated that she has desire for
the man, at least not until the Lord God sentences her to desire for her
‘husband’. However, the ‘desire to be wise’ is an extremely sophisticated
desire and which takes considerable time to develop. The inclusion of this
desire in this verse suggests a later insertion, the more so this desire does
not refer to the tree of the knowledge of good and bad. It is not stated that
the man has developed the desire for wisdom. Nor is it stated (indeed, anywhere
in the story) that he has desire for the tree of the knowledge of good and bad
25.21 … Later on (in verse
35), the Lord God actually sentences (or appears to sentence) the woman to have
desire (Hebrew: teshuwqah: meaning: (desire), longing, or
craving, rather than chamad, meaning: to desire, covet, take pleasure
in, take delight in), albeit for her ‘husband’. Whether or not that means that
she will no longer have desire for wisdom, whatever wisdom means to her, is not
stated. The Lord God does not state that desire, in this case (Hebrew: teshuwqah),
presumably, ‘of the flesh’, is sinful, wicked or evil and so on. It is not
stated that the woman’s desire to be wise (rather than have the knowledge of
good and bad) is sinful, wicked, evil and so on. In short, not only is desire
(specifically of the senses and of wisdom) not proscribed (i.e. forbidden) by
the Lord God, desire (i.e. of the senses) is actually imposed by Him (at least
for the woman). Later on, when the Lord God sees the need to issue
Commandments, He proscribes desire (Hebrew: chamad) for the neighbours’
property. He does not proscribe (physical) desire (i.e. longing or craving).
Paul’s blanket proscription of desire (to wit, “Thou shalt not covet”), and
which he misquotes from the 10th commandment, is a lie. The Early
Church fathers, in particular the Desert Fathers, claim, that desires is the
root of sin, and forbid it absolutely. By so doing they drive the laity to
repress the natural urge to desire and express that desire freely. Such
repression has disastrous consequences for the laity, but wonderful
consequences for the Church
25.22 … If the woman does
arrive at the (unidentified) tree alone, then the man could not have stopped
here picking the fruit, if indeed the tree is the one forbidden to him, and
which is not certain. Moreover, since the tree is not identified, save by the
woman’s personal descriptions, and since it is not stated that the man had ever
seen that particular tree, then the man would not have recognised the fruit
which she gives him to eat when he is with her. There is a some difficulty here
25.23 … It seems that the
man is not present when the woman picks and eats the fruit since, had he been
there, and since he had he not been beguiled or tempted - and which does not
seem to have been the case -, he could have prevented the woman from picking
and eating the fruit1,2
25.23.1 … Since it is not
stated that the man was beguiled (either by the serpent or the woman), he would
have, because of the death threat, stopped the woman from picking the fruit of
the tree and eating it
25.23.2 … Young’s less than
literal translation states: “and giveth the fruit to her husband with her and
he eats.” That seems to suggest that he is not with her as she picks the fruit
and eats it. It is quite possible that the woman gives the man the fruit later,
or elsewhere, when they meet up for tiffin
25.24 … The woman does not
express any emotion (save the desire for wisdom). She does not express love,
hate, happiness, unhappiness, fear, guilt, anger, shame, contrition and so. The
story is silent on the woman’s of emotion, both before and after eating of the
tree. Having discovered his nakedness, the man, but apparently not the woman,
expresses fear (but not shame)
25.25 … Neither the Lord God
nor the storyteller comment the fact that the woman does not die ‘in the day’
she eats of the (unidentified) tree
25.26 … It is not stated by
the storyteller that the woman, having eaten of the tree, acquires either wisdom
or the knowledge of good and bad. Nor does he state that the woman has
committed a transgression, nor, indeed, that she has offended the Lord God in
any way
25.27 … Whether or not the
woman gives the man the fruit to eat immediately, or a few minutes, hours or
days later, and at a different location, is not known
25.28 … It is not stated
that the woman tells the man about her conversation with the serpent. It is not
stated that she tells him she has eaten of the unidentified tree.1
Nor is it stated that, having told the man that she had eaten of the tree, she
discloses to him her reason for eating of the unidentified tree, and which may
or may not have been the tree forbidden to him. It is not stated by the
storyteller that she informs the man that she is offering him the fruit of the
tree of which she has eaten, and which could possibly be the one from which he
is forbidden to eat. Nor is it stated that she urges the man to eat
the fruit2
25.28.1 … The story does no
record a single conversation between the man and the woman.1 She
speaks only to the serpent and to the Lord God. Whether or not she communicates
with the man at all, and how, is not known. She gives him the fruit without as
much as a word. The storyteller does not indicate either that the woman
attempts to trick the man or that the man feels that he is being tricked
25.28.1.1 … The human relationship between the woman and
the man is not described.1 Her function as help-as-counterpart is
not described. It is not stated if her help-as-counterpart function (her
function as a woman (i.e. female) appears not to have been activated as this
point in the story) consists only in picking fruit for ‘her husband’ to eat, or
if other functions are required of her, save helping him avoid loneliness if,
indeed, he experiences loneliness, and which is not stated
25.28.1.1.1 … The story is
silent on the very personal relationship between the man and the woman.1
It is silent on intimacy, if any, between the ‘husband’ and his ‘wife’. The
story is silent on love, friendship, companionship, mutual respect, quality
time activity and so on. The story is absolutely silent on a sexual or
pre-sexual relationship between the ‘husband’ and his ‘wife’. The only time the
man responds to the woman, apart from taking the fruit which she gives him, is
when he renames her ‘Life’, though precisely why he decides to call her by that
name is not known
25.28.1.1.1.1 … The story is
also silent on the personal relationship between the woman and the Lord God
and, moreover, between the man and the Lord God.1 It is stated that
the Lord God forms the adam to ‘serve the ground’. He demands nothing of
the man save that he refrain from eating of the tree of the knowledge of good
and bad, because by eating of it ‘dying he will die in the day’. He clones the
woman as help-as-counter part for the man, thereby specifying their
relationship (i.e. in the most vague manner possible). Whether or not the Lord
God makes any personal relationship demands on the woman is not stated in the
story
25.28.1.1.1.1.1 … The Lord
God neither states that he wants a personal relationship with the man, nor is a
personal relationship (human or god-like) described. The man does not express
the desire for a personal relationship with the Lord God. Later claims
suggesting loss of relationship (for instance, by Benny 16), specifically the
loss of sanctifying grace as most significant part of that relationship (grace,
according to Augustine, being the all important part of their relationship),
are fabrication. No one knows what the Lord God thinks or feels about the man,
apart from worrying about the man’s loneliness (and which he resolves by making
a help-as-counterpart for him) and his survival prospects (and which he tries
to resolve by making a set of clothes for him). All that is known about their
relationship is that the man is formed to ‘serve the ground’ and that the Lord
God lays one charge (or health warning) upon the man
25.28.2 … Later on, in verse 36, the Lord God states: “Because you
have listened to (i.e. hearkened to, meaning obeyed) the voice of your wife …”.
The storyteller does not state that the woman speaks to the man as she hands
him the fruit to eat. When questioned by the Lord God, the man does not confirm
(in verse 31) that the woman spoke to him as she gave him the fruit to eat, or
that she urged him to eat the fruit. Only if the Lord God was present when the
woman gave the man the fruit to eat could the Lord God have known if the woman
spoke to the man and he listened (Hebrew: shama, meaning also to obey,
see 36.1). But it is not stated that the Lord God is present when the man
takers the fruit and eats it,1 for whatever reason. Hence the Lord
God either makes an erroneous assumption, or He is relying on false hearsay.
Why the storyteller produces conflicting statements is not known, unless the
verse fragment, “Because you have listened to (i.e. obeyed) the voice of your
wife (actually woman) …” is a later insertion intended to suggest either
temptation by the woman or obedience to the woman rather than to the Lord God,
or, indeed, deliberate intention on the part of the man to break the Lord God’s
command (and which is not even suggested by the storyteller). Obviously, the
Lord God’s uncertain assertion quoted above serves to increase the ambiguity of
the story (or oracle)
25.28.2.1 … The fact that
the Lord God asks the man two leading questions, i.e. in verse 30, namely, “Who
told you that you were naked?” and, “Have you eaten of the tree of which I
commanded you not to eat?”, indicates that the Lord God is ignorant of the
going’s on between the woman and the man. The Lord God’s questions (more
precisely stated, His mode of questioning that is intended elicit the facts,
i.e. the truth) appear initially to be not only severely inept but also unfair.
A fair (i.e. because not ‘leading’) question would have been, “What happened?”,1
and which would have given the man the opportunity to explain his understanding
of the events and, perhaps, to try to defend his actions, if, indeed, he thinks
it necessary to defend his actions. See the footnotes to sentences 30 and 31
25.28.2.1.1 … The man
actually responds to this (unspoken) question, rather than to the Lord God’s
leading questions, by stating exactly what had happened (i.e. in the
storyteller’s words). By avoiding answering the Lord God’s leading questions,
he avoids implicating himself. Whether by so doing he displays extreme
shrewdness (even cunning) or merely simple naivety cannot now be determined
with certainty
25.29 … According to the
storyteller (i.e. his 1st version), the man takes and eats the fruit
without a word being spoken. Whether or not he takes and eats it without a
thought is not known. Whether or not he knows from which tree the fruit he is
eating is comes from is not stated in the story.1 Whether or not the
man realizes that the fruit which he is eating comes from the forbidden tree
and he then eats it to deliberately break the Lord God’s command is not stated
in the story2
25.29.1. …This is crucial.
Does the man know (i.e. see with open eyes, therefore ‘know’) that he is eating
the fruit of the forbidden tree? If he is not aware that he is eating of the
forbidden tree then his transgression (if any, and a specific transgression is
not named by the storyteller, though asserted (but not proven) by the Lord God)
merits mitigating circumstances.1 In other words, if the man is
unaware of the fact that he is eating the fruit of the tree forbidden to him,
then intentional transgression does not happen
25.29.2 … The storyteller
does not state what the man’s intention is as he eats the fruit. However,
Augustine, the consummate liar (nowadays called spin doctor), knows better. He
invents, “Where God did nothing else than by a just sentence to condemn the man
who wilfully sins,1 together with his stock; there also, as a
matter of course, whatsoever was even not yet born is justly condemned in its
sinful root.” It is not stated the man knows that he is eating the forbidden
fruit. Nor is it stated that he ‘sins’ wilfully, i.e. that he eats the fruit to
intentionally break the Lord God’s command (or obey his wife). The Lord God
does not state, then or ever, that “whatsoever was even not yet born is justly
condemned in its sinful root”. Augustine is not just loading the dice, i.e. by
suggesting intentional wrongdoing on the part of the man, he is condemning all
future generations of humans to damnation. Here Augustine is perverting both
the truth and the course of justice, indeed, for all of humanity, at least
until the (3rd) arrival of the Redeemer
25.29.2.1 … That wilful
consent, hence deliberate intention, is required for sin (i.e. transgression)
to happen1 is elsewhere clearly stated by Augustine: “But if reason
consents and decides that what desire has stirred up should be carried out, man
is expelled from the whole happy life as if from paradise. For the sin is
already imputed to him, even if the deed is not carried out (!!!, my
insertion), since conscience is held guilty by reason of the consent.”
Whether or not the man and the woman are endowed with a conscience, or whether
or not conscience ‘emerges’ after the forbidden fruit is eaten, is not stated
in the story
25.29.2.1.1 … In ancient
Hebrew times, wilful consent (i.e. deliberate intention) is not required for
condemnation. Yahweh personally kills whole cities full of women and
children who have become unintentional accessories to what He judges to be a
crime. His absolutely merciless destruction of the women and children of Sodom
and Gomorrah supports the view expressed above
25.30 … The storyteller does
not state that the woman beguiles, tempts or seduces the man, or that she
intends so to do. Nor does he state that the woman beguiles the man to perform
a specific act (namely to eat deliberately of the forbidden tree in order to
break the Lord God’s command). The claim made centuries later by religious
fanatics that the woman (i.e. the help-as-counterpart, later renamed chavvah,
meaning ‘Life’) functions as temptress and/or seductress is fiction.
Tertullian’s flat assertion that all the daughters of Eve do likewise, thereby
functioning as ‘the gateway to the devil, and which suggests transmission of an
‘original’ capacity for temptation and/or seduction, and which results in
transgression and sin (and death), is malicious, indeed criminal religious
tripe (i.e. criminal because it leads to criminal acts on a vast scale) by
Christian clerics
25.31 … The function of the help-as-counterpart,
when first made, is not defined. It is stated that she is ‘made’ to help the
man overcome the fact that he is ‘alone’ (though it is not stated that he is
lonely). How she is to perform her function is not stated
25.32 … The story is
absolutely silent on the woman’s motives or intentions.1 It is not
stated that the woman gives of the fruit to the man to eat to deliberately tempt
(or dare, i.e. prove) him to break the Lord God’s command, so that he would
become ‘as the gods’. It appears more likely that she wants the man to acquire
wisdom, i.e. because ‘to be wise’ is desirable (though it is not stated why ‘to
be wise’ is desirable). However, the man does not express the desire ‘to be
wise.’ Why the man eats the fruit is not known
25.32.1 … The spin doctor,
Martin Luther, later writes, “This poison of Satan she drank with her ears; she
stretched out her hand to the forbidden fruit; and she ate it with her mouth.
And so she sins through all her senses of soul and body, and yet she is not
aware of her sin. She eats the fruit with pleasure, and she urges her husband
also to do the same.’ The storyteller does not state that she urges her husband
to eat the fruit
25.33 … The storyteller does
not state that the man recognises the fruit, nor, indeed, that he sees that
eating of it will make him wise
25.34 … Nowhere in the story
does the man express desire (either as chamad, meaning: covetousness, or
as teshuwqah, meaning: longing or craving). It is not stated
that he is formed with the capacity for desire, though desire is implied in
that the Lord God grows the trees ‘pleasant to the sight’. The claim made
centuries later that the man ‘desired’ and that ‘desire’ is the root cause of
‘sin’ is unfounded, malicious speculation
25.35 … The man does not ask
for fruit. He does not ask the woman from which tree the fruit has been picked.
There is no indication in the story that he has a preference for a particular
fruit. He simply takes the fruit in silence, and in silence eats
25.36 … This is absolutely
crucial. Since the man does not state at any time that he wants to become ‘as
the gods’, or even as the Lord God, all accusations that suggest the former are
unverifiable allegations
25.37 … Nowhere in the
story, prior to his ‘sending forth’, does the man express (or act out) desire
(Hebrew: teshuwqah, meaning: longing or craving) for the woman,
his help-as-counterpart. Nor does the Lord God later on sentence the man to
have desire for the woman. Moreover, the Lord God does not proscribe either of
the two forms of desire, both of which appear to be desire of the senses.
Centuries later, the Lord God will proscribe desire for the neighbour’s
property (i.e. in the 10th Commandment)
25.38 … This is crucial. The
man’s intention, if any, is not stated, either by himself or by the
storyteller. It is not stated that he eats the fruit because he wants to ‘be as
God’ or to ‘be as the gods’ or to be as the Lord God. It is not stated that he
deliberately eats the fruit to demonstrated his free will; nor that he seeks to
be disobedient or demonstrate rebelliousness, and so on. It is not stated that
he knows what he is eating. Whether or not the man eats the fruit with
deliberate intent1 or ‘by mistake’, or because he always eats the
fruit which the woman gives him (i.e. because he obeys her), is not known.
Later attempts to superimpose a reason (or intent or motive) on the man are
wild speculation2
25.38.1 … Augustine
fantasizes, “The deliberate sin of the first man is the cause of Original Sin.”
How deliberate the first man’s act of eating of the fruit which the woman gives
him (and which may or may not have come form the forbidden tree) is, is not
stated by the storyteller. If he eats the fruit, for instance to please his
helpmate,1 then, quite obviously, he does not sin, at least not
according to Augustine’s understanding, and which requires that the man intends
to deliberately break the Lord God’s command
25.38.2 … Augustine invents
a rather inane reason why the man eats the fruit. He fumbles, “… but that he by
the drawings of kindred yielded to the woman, the husband to the wife, the one
human being to the only other human being.” Elsewhere he drags Paul into his
free speculation with some truly cool spin. He writes, “For not without
significance did the apostle say, “And Adam was not deceived (by whom ??),
but the woman being deceived was in the transgression;” but he speaks thus,
because the woman accepted as true what the serpent told her (it is not
stated in the story that the woman accepted what the serpent had told her as
true, my insertion), but the man could not bear to be severed from his only
companion, even though this involved a partnership in sin. He was not on this
account less culpable, but sinned with his eyes open.”1 All the
former is the stuff of fantasy. Augustine invents false evidence, and which he
later ‘plants’ to prove the man’s guilt, indeed the fundamental guilt of all
humans. The man’s guilt, renamed as ‘sin,’ is later transmitted, so Augustine,
in the man’s (and every man’s) semen to all his offspring, thereby infecting
all with his guilt. In short, all are born guilty (i.e. of the adam’s
sin (read: crime).2 The ‘presumption of guilt’ which Augustine
finalizes, rather than invents, is an offer which the Pope cannot refuse, since
it provides the latter with the BIG STICK, in other words, with the rationale
for absolute power (and the means wherewith to establish the world’s most
successful protection racket)
25.38.2.1 … The man’s eyes
are opened (perhaps his conscience activated) and he ‘knows’ only after he has
eaten of the fruit, not before. Augustine’s reasoning, if not reading, is way
off the mark (hence sinful (Greek: hamartia), that is to say, in Paul’s
language)
25.38.2.2 … Augustine
writes, ‘The guilt, therefore, of that corruption of which we are speaking will
remain in the carnal offspring of the regenerate, until in them also it be
washed away in the laver of regeneration.”
25.39 … The story is silent
on both the man’s and the woman’s mental (and physical) capacities and of their
range, and/or their state of maturity.1 It is not stated how old the
pair are, nor how naïve (or shrewd) or even thoughtless (or thoughtful) they
are. Since nothing is known about what either the man or the woman think,
imagine, feel, hope or desire, or how aware they are, making an accurate, fair
and final judgement1 of their actions, and which could (some people
think, should) include giving them the ‘benefit of the doubt’, not to mention
the ‘presumption of innocence’ (and which neither the Lord God nor His
Christian Church, specifically the office of the Grand Inquisitor, lately so
ably guided by Joe Ratzinger, are prepared to give), is not possible
25.39.1 … Rather than
provide an unambiguous statement regarding the man and the woman’s intention to
break the Lord God’s command, and which the storyteller or a later redactor
could have inserted quite easily, i.e. with a single word, the storyteller
describes a sequence of acts resulting from misinformation, misunderstandings,
carelessness, day-dreaming, lack of forethought and poor communication. What
the storyteller is describing (and this is my personal opinion) is the
state of the normal (immature or adolescent) human, who gradually, but
unintentionally, ‘paints himself into a corner’. Idem Yahweh
25.40 … It is obvious that
the woman had become more subtle before she picks and eats the fruit of the
tree which she qualifies (and hence calls, hence names) as ‘to be desired to
make one wise’
25.41 … Once again Augustine
knows what both the storyteller and the Lord God do not know, namely, “Our
first parents fell into open disobedience because already they were secretly
corrupted (Wow!!!!, my insertion); for the evil act had never
been done had not an evil will preceded it. And what is the origin of our evil
will but pride? For “pride is the beginning of sin”.” Nowhere in the story is
it stated that the man and the woman have ‘an evil will’ (i.e. malicious
intent) or that they are ‘secretly corrupted’, or that they are ‘proud,’ or,
moreover, that eating of the forbidden tree is an ‘evil act.’ The pack of lies
which Augustine is here planting will, during the next 1200 years, have
disastrous consequences for the peoples of Europe
25.42 … Much more can be dug
out of this sentence. Why not have a go! This is your chance to show how
perceptive you have become